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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY iOF PORTSMOUTH 
LAURIE F. S. WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
V. AT LAW NUMBER: q ~ ~\., 4'-«.~- e.~ 
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A TRIAL BY JURY 
SANDY-BUTLER,-~~ C'(... II I I I t;' 
:MICHELLE "ROE", 
JANINE MOONEY, 
RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL, - 'U..t..o~-'- I I I I J t19 
RIVERSIDE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, t'.' :),.,_·,.:;-,..:..•' .-
NAN COULEMAN, 
PAUL REIN, 
and 
JAMES RIVER ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
. -· 
• • • "'~ () l 
.- -i •. ·.: ... \.} 
~:;. '~;: #r•-: -~ t -
\ • • # •• • • ~ ._ • ., 
\ . -- -· 
._ I : : ---~. ~ '., -~-~... --
\ .... .. ') 
\ \ ': . ~.., ';~~' 
\ \. \)_~~\ - ~~ 
\ (') -.-:1 
. ~- -"" 
\ 
TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned hereby moves the Circuit Court of the City of 
Portsmouth, Virginia, at the Courthouse thereof for a judgment and award against the defendants, 
SANDY B~ MICHELLE "ROE", JANINE .MO-ONEY, RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL, 
~GIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, NAN fOIJLEMAN, PAUL REIN, and JAMES 
RIVER ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, INC., jointl~ add severally, for the sum of TWO 
i . 
HUNDRED THOUSAND($200,000.00) DOLLARS with interest and costs for the following, to-
wit: 
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COUNT I 
1. That at all relevant times, Sandy Butler, was a pain management technician duly 
licensed to practice under the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and was acting as the agent 
and employee of the defendants, Riverside Hospital and Riverside Regional Medical Center, and 
within the course and scope of her employment, and the acts of the defendant, Sandy Butler, are 
imputed to the defendants, Riverside Hospital and Riverside Regional Medical Center. 
2. That at all times relevant hereto the defendant, Sandy Butler, was acting as the agent 
and employee of the defendants, Riverside Hospital and Riverside Regional Medical Center, and 
within the course and scope of her employment. 
3. That for a period of time commencing March 14, 1994 through March 17, 1994, the 
defendant was employed by plaintiff, for compensation, to skillfully and carefully provide pain 
management services to her relative to the birth of her daughter. 
4. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that she failed to exercise ~ 
or possess that reasonable degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised or possessed by similar 
practitioners in the City of Portsmouth and or in like areas in the Commonwealth of Virginia. That 
the negligence of the defendant, includes but is not limited to, negligently failing to administe~p_!.Qper 
pain management treatment to the plaintiff, causing infiltrations and other damages. 
-----···· --···--··-··-· 
5. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that she failed to properly 
treat and follow the plaintiff, all in violation of the standard of care of similar practitioners. 
6. That the defendant knew or should have known of the risks of the type of treatment 
she gave to the plaintiff and failed to properly administer the pain management treatment. After the 
= 
plaintiff's complaints and problems became known or should have become known, the defendant 
failed to follow the appropriate standard of care, all of which proximately caused her injuries. 
000002 
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7. That as a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence, the plaintiff, Laurie 
F. S. Waterman, has sustained pain, suffering, permanent injury and disfigurement, medical and loss 
. I 
I 
of earnings and in the future will be caused to suffer gre~t physical pain, mental anguish, medical 
expenses and loss of earnings. I 
I 
8. The said injuries will continue to permanently disable her from other activities 
formerly associated with her person and station in life. 
COUNTll 
9. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 tPt"ough 8 of the Motion for Judgment as I I 
if fully set forth herein. 
10. That at all relevant times, Michelle "Roe", was a pain management technician duly 
licensed to practice under the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and was acting as the agent 
and employee of the defendants, Riverside Hospital and iRiv~rside Regional Medical Center, and 
within the course and scope of her employment, and the a.Pts of the defendant, Michelle "Roe", are 
I 
imputed to the defendants, Riverside Hospital and Riverside Regional Medical Center. 
I. ; 
11. That at all times relevant hereto the defendant, Michelle "Roe", was acting as the 
agent and employee of the defendants, Riverside Hospital and Riverside Regional Medical Center, 
and within the course and scope of her employment. I 
12. That for a period of time commel)cing March 14, 1994 through March 17, 1994, the 
defendant was employed by plaintiff, for compensatio,, to1 skillfully and carefully provide pain 
management services to her relative t~ the birth of herd~· ugliter. 
• I 
13. That in treating the plaintift: the defendant , pegligent in that she failed to exercise 
or possess that reasonable degree of skill and care or~inarily exercised or possessed by similar 
I 
practitioners in the City ofPortsmouth and or in like areas in the Commonwealth of Virginia. That 
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the negligence of the defendant, includes but is not limited to, negligently failing to administer proper 
' pain management treatment to the plaintifl: causing infiltrations and other damage~. 
14. That in treating the plaintifi: the defendant was negligent in that she failed to properly 
treat and follow the plain tift: all in violation of the standard of care· of similar practitioners. 
15. That the defendant knew or should have known of the risks of the type of treatment 
she gave to the plaintiff and failed to properly administer the p~in management treatment. After the 
plaintiff's complaints and problems became known or should have become known, the defendant 
failed to follow the appropriate standard of care, all of which proximately caused her injuries. 
16. That as a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence, the plaintiff, Laurie 
F. S. Waterman, has sustained pain, suffering, permanent injury and disfigurement, medical and loss 
of earnings and in the future will be caused to suffer great physical pain, mental anguish, medical 
expenses and loss of earnings. 
17. The said injuries will continue to permanently disable her from other activitiess 
formerly associated with her person and station in life. 
COUNTID 
18. Plaintiffrepea~s and realleges paragraphs 1 through 17 of the Motion forJudgment 
as if fully set forth herein. 
19. That at all relevant times, Janine Mooney, was a pain management technician duly 
licensed to practice under the laws of the Commonwealth ofVrrginia, and was acting as _the agent 
and employee of the defendants, Riverside Hospital and Riverside Regional Medical Center, and 
within the course and scope of her employment, and the acts of the defendant, Janine Mooney, are 
BREIT.~u~~c:R.~sRBIT imputed to the defendants, Riversid~ Hospital and Riverside Regional Medical Center. 
Norfolk, Virsinia 23510 
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20. That at all times relevant hereto the defendant, Janine Mooney, was acting as the 
agent and employee of the defendants, Riverside Hospital and Riverside Regional Medical Center, 
and within the course and scope of her employment. 
21. That for a period of time commencing Marcp 14; 1994 through March 17, 1994, the 
defendant was employed by plaintiff, for compensation,1 to skillfully and carefully provide pain 
management services to her relative to the birth of her daughter. 
22. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that she failed to exercise 
or possess that reasonable degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised or. possessed by similar 
practitioners in the City ofPortsmouth and or in like area~ in the Commonwealth of Virginia. That 
the negligence of the defendant, includes but is not limited to, negligently failing to administer proper 
pain management treatment to the plaintiff, causing infiltrations and other damages. 
23. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that she failed to properly 
treat and follow the plaintiff, all in violation of the standard of care of similar practitioners. 
24. That the defendant knew or should have known of the risks of the type of treatment 
she gave to the plaintiff and failed to properly administer the pain management treatment. After the 
I 
plaintiffs complaints and problems became known or ~hould have become known, the defendant 
failed to follow the appropriate standard of care, all of ~hiqh proximately caused her injuries. 
25. That as a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence, the plaintiff, Laurie 
F. S. Waterman, has sustained pain, suffering, permanent injury and disfigurement, medical and loss 
! i 
of earnings and in the future will be caused to suffer great 1physical pain, mental anguish, medical 
I ; 
expenses and loss of earnings. 
' 26. The said injuries will continue to pel]Illan~ntly disable her from other activities 
I 
I 
formerly associated with her person and station in life. 
ooooos 
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COUNT IV 
· 27. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 26 of the Motion for Judgment 
as if fully set forth herein. 
28. Upon information and belief, the defendant, Riverside Hospital, is a corporation 
organized and under the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, with its principal office and place 
of business in Newport News, Virginia, and which regularly solicits business in the City of 
Portsmouth, VIrginia. Riverside Hospital is a corporation regularly doing business according to the 
appropriate statutes in the Commonwealth of Virginia, City ofPortsmouth, .and is subject to and 
within the jurisdiction and venue of this Honorable Court. 
29. That at all relevant times, Riverside Hospital, was a medical care facility duly licensed 
to practice under the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
30. That for a period of time commencing March 14, 1994 through March 17, 1994, the' 
defendant was employed by plaintiff, for compensation, to skillfully and carefully provide medical. 
care services to her relative to the birth of her daughter. 
31. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that it failed to exercise 
or possess that reasonable degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised or possessed by similar 
practitioners in the City ofPortsmouth and or in like areas in the Commonwealth of Virginia. That 
the negligence of the defendant, includes but is not limited to, negligently failing to administer proper 
medical treatment to the plaintiff, causing infiltrations and other damages. 
32. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that it failed to properly 
treat and follow the plaintiff, all in violation of the standard of care of similar practitioners. 
33. That the defendant knew or should have known of the risks of the type of treatment 
it provided to the plaintiff and failed to properly administer medical care. After the plaintiff's 
000006 
I 
I 
. I 
complaints and problems became known or should have l>ecome known, the defendant failed to 
I 
• I 
follow the appropriate standard of care, all of which proximately caused her injuries. 
! 
34. That as a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence, the plaintiff, Laurie 
F. S. Watennan, has sustained pain, suffering, permanent injury and disfigurement, medical and loss 
of earnings and in the future will be caused to suffer great physical pain, mental anguish, medical 
expenses and loss of earnings. 
3 5. The said injuries will continue to permanently disable her from other activities 
formerly associated with her person and station in life. 
COUNTY 
36. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs J: through 35 of the Motion for Judgment 
as if fully set forth herein. 
37. Upon information and belief, the defendant, Riverside Regionat Medical Center, is 
a corporation organized and under the laws of the Cominonwealth of Virginia, with its principal 
office and place ofbusiness in Newport News, Virginia, and which regularly solicits business in the 
City of Portsmouth, Virginia. Riverside Regional Medical Center is a corporation regularly doing 
business according to the appropriate statutes in the Commonwealth ofVirginia, City of Portsmouth, 
and is subject to and within the jurisdiction and venue of this Honorable Court. 
' 
' 
38. That at all relevant times, Riverside Regional Medical Center,. was a medical care 
I 
facility duly licensed to practice under the laws of the C?mmonwealth of Virginia. 
39. That for a period of time commencing h 14, 1994 through March 17, 1994, the 
defendant was employed by plaintiff, for compensation, to Sfllfully and carefully provide medical 
tawOffice.sOf care services to her relative to the birth of her daughter. 
3REIT, DRESCHER. I< BREIT 
Norfolk, V1rJiDia 23510 
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40. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that it failed to exercise 
or possess that reasonable degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised or possessed by similar 
practitioners in the City ofPortsmouthand or in like areas in the Commonwealth ofVirginia. That 
the negligence of the defendant, includes but is not limited to, negligently failing to administer prope~ 
medical treatment to the plaintiff, causing infiltrations and other damages. 
41. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that it failed to properly 
treat and follow the plaintiff, all in violation of the standard of care of similar practitioners. 
42. That the defendant knew or should have known of the risks of the type of treatment 
it provided to the plaintiff and failed to properly administer medical care. After the plaintiffs 
complaints and problems became known or should have become known, the· defendant failed to 
follow the appropriate standard of care, all of which proximately caused her injuries. 
43. That as a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence, the plaintiff, Laurie 
F. S. Watennan, has sustained pain, suffering, permanent injury and disfigurement, medical and loss 
of earnings and in the future will be caused to suffer great physical pain, mental anguish, medical 
expenses and loss of earnings. 
44. The said injuries will continue to permanently disable her from other activities 
formerly associated with her person and station in life. 
COUNT VI 
45. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 44 of the Motion for Judgment 
as if fully set forth herein. 
46. That at all relevant times, Nan Couleman, was an anesthesiologist duly licensed to 
practice under the laws of the Commonwealth ofVrrginia, and was acting as the agent and employee 
of the defendant, James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc., and within 
000008 
the course and scope ofher employment, and the acts of the defendant, Nan Couleman, are imputed 
to the defendant, James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc. 
47. That at all times relevant hereto the defendant, Nan Couleman, was acting as the 
agent and employee of the defendant, James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc., and within the course 
and scope of her employment. 
48. That for a period of time commencing March 14, 1994 through March 17, 1994, the 
defendant was employed by plaintifi: for compensation, to skillfully and carefully provide anesthesia 
services to her relative to the birth of her daughter. 
49. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that she failed to exercise 
or possess that reasonable degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised or possessed by similar 
practitioners in the City ofPortsmouth and or in like areas in the Commonwealth of Virginia. That 
the negligence of the defendant, includes but is not limited to, negligently failing to properly 
administer anesthesia to the plaintiff, causing infiltrations and other damages. 
50. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that she failed to properly 
treat and follow the plaintiff, all in violation of the standard of care of similar practitioners. 
51. That the defendant knew or should have known of the risks of the type of treatment 
she gave to the plaintiff and failed to properly administer the anesthesia. After the plaintiffs 
complaints and problems became known or should have become known, the defendant failed to 
. . 
follow the appropriate standard of care, all ofwhich proximately caused her injuries. 
52. That as a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence, the plaintiff, Laurie 
F. S. Waterman, has sustained pain, suffering, permanent injury and disfigurement, medical and loss 
JREIT.~~~;_o~BRBIT of earnings and in the future will be caused to suffer great physical pain, mental anguish, medical 
Norfolk, Vl.rgillla 23510 
expenses and loss of earnings. 
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53. The said injuries will continue to permanently disable her from other activities 
formerly associated with her person and station in life. 
COUNT VI 
54. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 53 of the Motion for Judgment. 
as if fully set forth herein. 
55. That at all relevant times, Paul Rein, was an anesthesiologist duly licensed to practice 
under the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and was acting as the agent and employee of the 
defendant, James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc., and within the course and scope of his 
employment, and the acts of the defendant, Paul Rein, are imputed to the defendant, James River 
Anesthesia Associates, Inc. 
56. That at all times relevant hereto the defendant, Paul Rein, was acting as the agent and 
employee of the defendant, James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc., and within the course and scope" 
of his employment. 
57. That for a period of time commencing March 14, 1994 through March 17, 1994, the 
defendant was employed by plaintiff, for compensation, to skillfully and carefully provide anesthesia 
services to her relative to the birth of her daughter. 
58. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that he failed to exercise 
or possess that reasonable degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised or possessed by similar 
practitioners in the City of Portsmouth and or in like areas in the Commonwealth of Virginia. That 
the negligence of the defendant, includes but is not limited to, negligently failing to properly 
administer anesthesia to the plaintiff, causing infiltrations and other damages. 
59. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that he failed to properly 
treat and follow the plaintiff, all in violation of the standard of care of similar practitioners. 
Ia 00001.0 
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60. That the defendant knew or should have kno~n of the risks of the type of treatment 
he gave to the plaintiff and failed to properly administer the anesthesia. After the plaintiff's 
complaints and problems became known or should have become known, the defendant failed to 
follow the appropriate standard of care, all of which proximately caused her injuries. 
61. That as a direct and proximate result of def{lndant's negligence, the plaintiff, Laurie 
F. S. Waterman, has sustained pain, suffering, permanent injury and disfigurement, medical and loss 
of earnings and in the future will be caused to suffer great1 physical pain, mental anguish, medical 
expenses and loss of earnings. 
62. The said injuries will continue to permanently disable her from other activities 
formerly associated with her person and station in life. 
COUNTVlll 
63. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 62 of the Motion for Judgment 
as if fully set forth herein. 
64. Upon information and belief, the defendant, James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc., 
is a corporation organized and under the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, with its principal 
office and place ofbusiness in Newport News, Virginia, and which regularly solicits business in the 
City of Portsmouth, Virginia. James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc. is a corporation regularly 
doing business according to the appropriate statutes in ,~he Commonwealth of Virginia, City of 
Portsmouth, and is subject to and within the jurisdiction and venue of this Honorable Court. 
65. That at all relevant times, James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc., was a medical care 
provider duly licensed to practice under the laws of the· Gommonwealth of Virginia. 
It 
00001.1. 
Law Offices Of 
REJT, DRESCHER. It BREIT 
Norfolk, Virginia 23510 
66. That for a period of time commencing March 14, 1994 through March 17, 1994, the 
defendant was employed by plaintiff, for compensation, to skillfully and carefully provide medical 
care services to her relative to the birth of her daughter. 
67. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that it failed to exercise 
or possess that reasonable degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised or possessed by similar 
practitioners in the City ofPortsmouth and or in like areas in the Commonwealth of Virginia. That 
the negligence of the defendant, includes but is not limited to, negligently failing to administer proper 
medical treatment to the plaintiff, causing infiltrations and other damages. 
68. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that it failed to properly 
treat and follow the plaintiff, all in violation of the standard of care of similar practitioners. 
69. That the defendant knew or should have known of the risks of the type of treatment 
it provided to the plaintiff and failed to properly administer medical care. After the plaintiff's 
complaints and problems became known or should have become known, the defendant failed to 
follow the appropriate standard of care, all of which proximately caused her injuries. 
70. That as a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence, the plaintiff, Laurie 
F. S. Waterman, has sustained pain, suffering, permanent injury and disfigurement, medical and loss 
of earnings and in the future will be caused to suffer great physical pain, mental anguish, medical 
expenses and loss of earnings. 
71. The said injuries will continue to permanently disable her from other activities 
formerly associated with her person and station in life. 
72. That by reason of and as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of all of the 
defendant's SANDY BUTLER, MICHELLE 11ROE11 , JANINE MOONEY, RIVERSIDE 
HOSPITAL, RIVERSIDE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, NAN COULEMAN, PAUL REIN, 
IZ 00001.2 
and JAMES RIVER ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, INC., individually and collectively, in breaching 
the duty of care owed to the plaintiff by providing substandard anesthesia and pain management 
treatment continuously and without substantial interruption during March 14- March 17, 1994, the 
plaintiff was caused to suffer infiltrations and other damages such as corrective surgeries, lost 
earnings and continued pain, suffering and inconvenience. 
73. That by reason of and as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the 
defendant's, SANDY BUTLER, MICHELLE "ROE", JANINE MOONEY, RIVERSIDE 
HOSPITAL, RIVERSIDE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, NAN COULEMAN, PAUL REIN, 
and JAMES RIVER ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, INC., jointly and severally, the plaintiff has 
sustained damages in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND ($200,000.00) DOLLARS, 
representing damages for the negligence aforesaid. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff moves this Honorable Court for a judgment against the 
defendants, SANDY BUTLER, MICHELLE "ROE", JANINE MOONEY, RIVERSIDE 
HOSPITAL,RIVERSIDEREGIONALMEDICAL CENTER, NAN COULEMAN, PAUL REIN, 
and JAMES RIVER ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, INC., jointly and severally, in the amount of 
TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($200,000.00), with interest and costs aforesaid. 
Jeffrey A. Breit 
BREIT, DRESCHER & BREIT 
1000 Dominion Tower 
LawOfficesOf 999 Waterside Drive 
tEIT, DRESCHER,& BREIT 
Norfolk, VirginlaZ3SlO Norfolk, VA 23510 
(757) 622-6000 
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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
LAURIEF.S: WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. LawNo.: L97-1776 
SANDY BUTLER, MICHELLE "ROE", 
JANINE MOONEY, RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL, 
RIVERSIDE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
NAN COULEMAN, PAUL REIN, and 
JAMES RIVER ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, INC. 
MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW the defendant, Janine Mooney, by counsel, and moves this Honorable Court 
for entry of an order quashing service of the Motion for Judgment and dismissing plaintiffs claims 
against her on the grounds that service was not timely made upon her. In support of this motion, the 
defendant states as follows: 
1. Virginia Code Section 8.01-277 (1998 Cum. Supp.) allows this defendant to file a 
Motion to Quash Service either prior to or simultaneously with the filing of any pleading to the 
merits and permits the Court to strike the proof of service upon sustaining such Motion. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment was filed on or about October 3, 1997. 
3. Defendant Janine Mooney was not served until October 8, 1998. 
4. Rule 3:3(c) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia states in pertinent part that 
"No judgment shall be entered against a defendant who was served with process more than one year 
after the commmencement of the action against him unless the court fmds as a fact that the plaintiff 
exercised due diligence to have timely service on him." 
Section 8.01-275.1 (1998 Cum. Supp.). 
,_I 
5. Service on this defendant is clearly beyond the one-year limitation on service 
provided for by Rule 3:3(c) and Virginia Code Section 8.01-275.1. The Supreme Court has defined 
due diligence as "'devoted and painstaking application to accomplish an undertaking."' Dennis v. 
Jones, 240 Va. 12, 19 (1990) (quoting Webster's Third International Dictionazy 633 (1981)). There 
is no evidence that the plaintiff exercised "due diligence" in attempting to serve this defendant. 
6. As service on this defendant has been untimely and without a showing of due 
diligence, the Court should dismiss the Motion for Judgment with prejudice as to this defendant as 
required by Gilbreath v. Brewster, 250 Va. 436 (1995). 
WHEREFORE, this defendant respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order granting 
her Motion to Quash Service; ordering that the proof of service be striken; and dismissing with 
prejudice plaintiff's claim against her~ together with awarding her costs and fees expended, and for 
such other and further relief the Court deems just and proper. 
JANINE MOONEY 
By:-/~Q.~ 
Carolyn P. Oast, Esq. 
Todd D. Anderson, Esq. 
HEILIG, MCKENRY, FRAIM & LOLLAR, P.C. 
700 Newtown Road 
Norfolk, VA 23502 
(757) 461-2500 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. I 
Counsel 
jA/ 
I hereby certify that on this~day of October 1998, I mailed a copy ofthe foregoing to all 
counsel of record. 
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V I R G I N I A: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
LAURIE F. s . WATERMAN I 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SANDY BUTLER, et al., 
Defendants. 
At Law No. 97-1776 
PLEA OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
AND MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc., and 
moves this Honorable court to grant it~ plea of the statute of 
limitations and dismiss the Motion for Judgment filed against it 
with prejudice. 
1. According to count VIII of the plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment, it is alleged in ! 66 that James River Anesthesia 
Associates, Inc. was her medical care provider between March 14, 
1994 and March 17, 1994, and in ! 67, the plaintiff alleges 
that during this period of treatment, James River Anesthesia 
Associates, Inc. negligently treated her. 
2. The statute of limitations· for a claim for personal 
injuries involving medical malprac~ice according to § 8.01-243 
of the Code of Virginia is two years. 
3. No exceptions to the time limitations contained in 
§ 8.01-243 of the Code have been alleged by the plaintiff. 
ClRCUlT COUR R 
4. The plaintiff's Motion foFo~V*as filed in the 
Clerk's Office on October 3, 1997,~i ~e~~ in count VIII 
/D ~/to· 98 
.~;'ALTER M. EDMONDS, CLERli 
WTtJ 00001.6 n.n 
against James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc. is time barred 
as paving been filed after the statute of limitations expired. 
WHEREFORE, this defendant requests the court to sustain its 
plea of the statute of limitations and dismiss the Motion for 
Judgment against it with prejudice. 
By: 
22030 
JAMES RIVER ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, INC. 
By Counsel 
Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Plea of the 
statute of Limitations and Motion to Dismiss was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this~~ of October, 1998 to Avery T. Waterman, 
Jr., Esq., Patten, Wornom & Watkins, L.C., 12350 Jefferson 
Avenue, Suite 360, Newport News, Virginia 23602, counsel for 
plaintiff; and Nelson Sinclair, President, Riverside Regional 
Medical Center, 500 J. Clyde Morris Boulevard, Newport News, 
Virginia 23601, 
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V I R G I N I A: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
LAURIE F. S. WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SANDY BUTLER, et al., 
Defendants. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
At Law No. 97-1776 
PLEA OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
AND MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW Paul Rein, M.D., and moves this Honorable court 
to grant his plea of the statute of limitations and dismiss the 
Motion for Judgment filed against him with prejudice. 
1. According to Count VI [sic] of the plaintiff's Motion 
for Judgment, it is alleged in ! 57 that Dr. Rein was her 
physician between March 14, 1994 and March 17, 1994, and in 
! 58, the plaintiff alleges that during this period of 
treatment, Dr. Rein negligently treated her. 
2. The statute of limitations for a claim for personal 
injuries involving medical malpractice according to 
§ 8.01-243 of the Code of Virginia is two years. 
3. No exceptions to the time limitations contained in 
§ 8.01-243 of the Code have been alleged by the plaintiff. 
4. The plaintiff's Motion for Judgment was filed in the 
Clerk's Office on October 3, 1997, and ~~~U?fe~R~ Count VI ~ 
[sic] against Dr. Rein is time barred ~RffaV~WgHb~~n filed after 
the statute of limitations expired. ~ l ~ ~ [) 
/0 ·lfLJ ·9~ 
WALTER M. EDMONDS, CLERl\ 00001.8 
~I t.rj1f - o.. o.. 
• I 
WHEREFORE, this defendant requests the court to sustain his 
plea of the statute of limitations and dismiss the Motion for 
Judgment against him with prejudice. 
GERALD R. WALSH, P.C. 
4020 University Drive 
suite 200 
Fairfax, Virginia 22030 
~:~J)A n 
Gerald R. Walsh 
PAUL REIN, M.D. 
By Counsel 
Va. State· Bar No. 8157 
Counsel for Defendant Paul Rein, M.D. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Plea of the 
statute of Limitat~d Motion to Dismiss was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this~ ~of October, 1998 to Avery T. Waterman, 
Jr., Esq., Patten, Wornom & Watkins, L.C., 12350 Jefferson 
Avenue, Suite 360, Newport News, Virginia 23602, counsel for 
plaintiff; and Nelson Sinclair, President, Riverside Regional 
Medical Center, 500 J. Clyde Morris Boulevard, Newport News, 
Virginia 23601, 
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V I R G I N I A: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
LAURIE F. S. WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SANDY BUTLER, et al., 
Defendants. 
0 
0 
At Law No. 97-1776 
PLEA OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
AND MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW Nancy Couleman, M.D., and moves this Honorable 
Court to grant her plea of the statute of limitations and 
dismiss the Motion for Judgment filed against her with 
prejudice. 
1. According to count VI of the plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment, it is allege~ in ! 48 that Dr. Couleman was her 
physician between March 14, 1994 and March 17, 1994, and in 
! 49, the plaintiff alleges that during this period of 
treatment, Dr. Couleman negligently treated her. 
2. The statute of limitations for a claim for personal 
injuries involving medical malpractice according to § 8.01-243 
of the Code of Virginia is two years. 
3. No exceptions to the time limitations contained in 
§ 8.01-243 of the Code have been alleged by the plaintiff. 
4 0 The plaintiff Is Motion for JU~@tf\:f w~S'Rl:iled in the 
.anRJSM0\)1\-\, VA. Clerk's Office on October 3, 1997, and ~ne· cia1m~i~Count VI 
f l lL 1£~ fiJI 
/0 .-f{{l .. Cf'!/ 
M EDMONDS~. CLE.R~ ~3 :LTmu ~O..I'L 000020 
! 
• 
.• 
against Dr. Couleman is time barred as having been filed after 
th~ statute of limitations expired. 
WHEREFORE, this defendant requests the court to sustain her 
plea of the statute of limitations and dismiss the Motion for 
Judgment against her with prejudice. 
By: 
22030 
NANCY COULEMAN, M.D. 
By Counsel 
Va. State Bar No. 8157 
Counsel for Defendant Nancy Couleman, M.D. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Plea of the 
statute of Limitations and Motion to Dismiss was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this ~~~ of October, 1998 to Avery T. Waterman, 
Jr., Esq., Patten, Wornom & Watkins, L.C., 12350 Jefferson 
Avenue, Suite 360, Newport News, Virginia 23602, counsel.for 
plaintiff; and Nelson Sinclair, President, Riverside Regional 
Medical Center, 500 J. Clyde Morris Boulevard, Newport News, 
Virginia 23601, 
L<3C) w~ 
Gerald R. Walsh 
c""ti 
_,,.. 
I 
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V I R G I N I A: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
LAURIE F. s. WATERMAN I 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SANDY BUTLER, et al., 
Defendants. 
At Law No. 97-1776 
PLEA IN BAR AND MOTION TO 
DISMISS OF DEFENDANT COULEMAN 
COMES NOW defendant Nancy Couleman, M.D., and files her 
Plea in Bar and Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds. 
1. The plaintiff alleges in ! 48 of Count VI of her 
Motion for Judgment that the act~ of negligence of defendant 
couleman occurred between March 14·,· 1994 and March 17, 1994. 
2. Plaintiff originally commenced an action against 
defendant Couleman and others by filing a Motion for Judgment in 
Law No. 96-459 in the circuit Court of the City of Portsmouth on 
March 18, 1996. 
3. No service of the Motion for Judgment filed in Law No. 
96-459 was ever timely made against defendant Couleman within 12 
months of commencement of the action as required by the 
provisions of Va. Code § 8.01-275.1. 
4. On April 28, i997; the Motion for Judgment .. i;n:;t;~w- No. 
. . . . ... ,-:::: / .. ; .. --~·· ·-~ ·::':){:· 
96-459, which was filed but unserved 'within the 12:-iilontns 
.. ' p .. • ,;&,. 
.. , .... 
. . . - .. 
· ·. .. . . \DEC 1S~~ 
· ~ .. : ·city. of Portsmouth 
· ·: _, Circuit Court · 
·~?-. . w. al~·e .Edmond. 5 . ·•· 
· ·.:;. Cle .;:, 
-:;- ; .., ..... ,-._.' 2 <.~·- . . ·~ 0002 
_. - -. . - . ~ _ .. -· 
.. - -· 
: 
required by va. Code § 8.01-275.1, was non-suited pursuant to 
va., Code § 8.01-380. 
5. Since the Motion for Judgment in Law No. 96-459 had 
never been timely served as to defendant Couleman because there 
had been no service of process on defendant Couleman as required 
Va. Code§ 8.01-275.1, the Non-Suit Order of April 28, 1997, was 
of no effect since the court did not have jurisdiction to enter 
the Non-Suit Order. Only if there had been service on defendant 
Couleman within the 12 mon~hs :required in § 8.01-275.1 would the 
court have jurisdiction to act to dismiss the action without 
prejudice as it did. 
6. Since defendant Couleman was not timely served within 
12 months of the filing of Law No. 96-459, any subsequent action 
relying on that action cannot be the legal basis to seek any 
judgment against defendant Couleman. 
7. The Motion for Judgment in Law No. 97-1776, filed on 
October 31, 1997, is filed after the statute of limitations of 
two years has expired and this action is therefore time barred. 
For the foregoing reasons, and under the authority of the 
referenced Code provisions, defendant Couleman requests that the 
court dismiss the Motion for Judgment filed in this action. 
NANCY COULEMAN, M.D. 
By Counse~ 
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GERALD R. WALSH, P.C. 
4020 University Drive 
Suite 200 
Fairfax, Virginia 22030 
(703) 385-6162 
By: 2:: Wal~ {A/~ 
Va. State Bar No. 8157 
Counsel for Defendant Nancy couleman, M.D. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of t~~oregoing Plea in Bar 
was mailed, postage prepaid, this CfB~~of December, 1998 to 
Avery T. Waterman, Jr., Esq., Patten, Wornom & Watkins, L.c., 
12350 Jefferson Avenue, Suite 360, Newport News, Virginia 
23602, counsel for plaintiff; and Carolyn P. Oast, Attorney at 
Law, Heilig, McKenry, Fraim and Lollar, P.C., Stoney Point 
Center, 700 Newtown Road, Norfolk, Virginia 23502-3999, counsel. 
for Riverside Hospital, Sandy Butler, Michelle "Roe," also 
identified as Michelle "Roe" McCormick, Janine Mooney, and 
Riverside Regional Medical Ce 
f\~~ 
R. Walsh 
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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
r 
LAURIE F.S. WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. Law No.: 26466-RC 
-
o r~·. U) 
;~ ...4 ~:; \.0 
(r': ~ ,.; .. -:, c.. 
i : -·. '>~: :;:; c:=. 
\ •7: .'"'-· -;;;.::. 
\ \ ~:·:~\ f~ 
l \ ·~ ... ~;~; . 
\ \ .::. ,.... ::::"" . 'ol ·~ 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE SPECIAL PLEA O:Jf 1.\A€~, OP:. ., 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND MOTION TO DIS·~~S~~ ~ ··~::J 
\ :.-::1 0 {') 
COME NOW the defendants, Riverside Hospital, Riverside Regional e~c~ ~enter, 
SANDY BUTLER, et al., 
. . ·- :~ 
\ 
Sandy Butler, Michelle "Roe" McCormick, and Janine Mooney, by counsel, and submit this Brief 
in Support of their Special Plea of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss, 
filed herewith. As grounds for this Motion, the defendants assert that this Court lacks jurisdiction 
to enter an order against them and further state as follows: 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This medical malpractice action asserting seventy-three separate allegations of negligence 
against eight defendants arises out of care and treatment provided to the plaintiff from March 14 
through March 17, 1994. The original Motion for Judgment was apparently filed in the Circuit 
Court for the City of Portsmouth on March 18, 1996. Neither a copy of this Motion for 
Judgment nor a Notice of Motion for Judgment was ever served upon any defendant. On April 
I I 
28, 1997, well over a year after filing the Motion for Judgm~t, the plaintiff was granted a 
nonsuit. As the defendants had never been served with Notice of the Motion for Judgment, they 
were unaware thatthis lawsuit was pending against them and ~ere furthermore unaware that th~ 
plaintiff had moved the Court for entry of an Order of Nonsuit. Accordingly, the defendants did 
I I 
! ~ 
I I 
.•. 
not have the opportunity to contest the nonsuit nor appeal its entry. 1 
The plaintiffrefiled her lawsuit in the Circuit Court for the City of Portsmouth on October 
3, 1997. Nearly one year later, on September 23, 1998, a Notice of Motion for Judgment was 
finally served upon the defendants Riverside Hospital, Riverside Regional Medical Center, Sandy 
Butler, and Michelle "Roe" McCormick. Notice of the Motion for Judgment was not filed upon 
the defendant, Janine Mooney until October 8, 1998. By order entered January 6, 1999, this 
action was transferred to the Circuit Court for the City of Newport News. 
These defendants contend that the Circuit Court for the City of Portsmouth lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to enter the Order of Nonsuit of April 28, 1997, since Rule 3:3 of the Rules 
of the Supreme Court of Virginia divests the court of the authority to enter any order against a 
defendant who has not been served with Notice of the Motion for Judgment within one year of 
filing a lawsuit. Accordingly, the nonsuit order was improperly entered and this court now lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear this claim. Therefore, this Court should dismiss, with 
prejudice, the plaintiffs claim as to these defendants. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
Rule 3:3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia states that "[n]o judgment shall 
1 See McManama v. Plunk, 250 Va. 27, 458 S.E.2d 759 (1995): 
An order of nonsuit is a final, appealable order within the meaning of Code § 
8.01-670(A)(3) ("any person may present a petition for an appeal to the 
Supreme Court if he believes himself aggrieved ... [b ]y a final judgment in 
any ... civil case"), only when a dispute exists whether the trial court properly 
granted a motion for nonsuit. 
/d. at 32, 458 S.E.2d at 761 (citing Wells v. Larcom House Condominiums' Council, 237 Va. 
247, 251, 377 S.E.2d 381, 383 (1989)). 
2 
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be entered against a defendant who was served with process more than one year after the 
commencement of the action against him unless the court finds as a fact that the plaintiff 
exercised due diligence to have timely service on him." The rule has two operative parts. First, 
it divests the trial court of authority and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, by stating that 
"no judgment shall be entered against a defendant" who was not timely served. The second 
operative part provides that this divestment of authority to enter an order against the defendant 
shall not be effective if the court "finds as a fact that the plaintiff exercised due diligence to have 
timely service" on the defendant. Thus, the Rule requires the trial court to investigate whether 
the plaintiff has exercised "due diligence." 
To these defendants' knowledge, there is no record of·the hearing on the plaintiffs 
Motion for Nonsuit, and, indeed, it is possible that there was no formal hearing. Furthermore, 
the Court's Order granting the nonsuit fails to state any findings of fact indicating that the 
plaintiff established that she had exercised due diligence in attempting to serve the original 
Motion for Judgment. Absent such a finding of fact, Rule 3:3 holds that no judgment can be 
entered against these defendants. This language divests the court of the authority or jurisdiction 
to enter a judgment against these defendants. Once divested of subject matter jurisdiction, the 
Circuit Court for the City of Portsmouth was also divested of the authority to enter the nonsuit 
order. As Justice Poffwrote in Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va .. 166, 387 S.E.2d 753 (1990), "if [the 
plaintiffs] first motion for judgment was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, there was 
no predicate for the nonsuit." ld. at 177, 387 S.E.2d at 760 (J. Poff, dissenting). 
It is important to note that the operative language o£ Rule 3:3 is jurisdictional rather than 
merely procedural. An issue similar to the one at hand was addressed by the Supreme Court of 
3 
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Virginia in Morrison, cited above. That case involved the notice provisions of former Virginia 
Code Section 8.01-581.2, which required that a prospective plaintiff in a medical malpractice 
action submit a notice to her health care provider of the claim and then wait ninety days before 
filing her Motion for Judgment. The issue was whether a plaintiff, by filing a Motion for 
Judgment within this 90-day waiting period and thereby violating this statute, deprived the trial 
court of jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court held that "the prohibition contained in Code § 
8.01-581.2 against filing suit prior to 90 days after giving notice of a medical malpractice claim 
[was] a mandatory procedural requirement [and] [f]ailure to comply with this provi~ion [did] not 
divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction." Morrison at 173, 387 S.E.2d at 757-58. 
The issue presented in Morrison, however, is distinguishable from the issue presented in 
this case. Former Code Section 8.01-581.2, upon which the Court based its ruling in Morrison, 
stated that "[n]o action ... shall be brought" within ninety days of the notification formerly 
required to be given to the health care provider by the claimant-plaintiff. Rule 3:3, however, 
states "[n]o judgment shall be entered." The former provision speaks to the plaintiff and her 
ability to bring suit; the latter speaks to the court and its ability to render judgment. Thus, while 
the first is procedural, the second is jurisdictional. In fact, this was precisely the conclusion 
drawn by Justice Lacy, writing in dicta for the Coun, wherein she stated "if the 90-day waiting 
period for filing the motion for judgment goes to the issue of the court's subject matter 
jurisdiction . . . the trial court did not have, and could never have, the ability to enter a valid 
judgment." Morrison at 170, 387 S.E.2d at 756. This is precisely the result that Rule 3:3 and 
Virginia Code Section 275.1 mandate; this court "[does] not have, and could never have, the 
ability to enter a valid judgment" against these defendants. 
4 
&1 
To elaborate further on this point, it is admitted that not all statutes which speak directly 
to the court· are jurisdictional in nature. However, Rule 3:3 does not state, "a case shall be 
dismissed unless the court finds that the plaintiff exercised due diligence to serve the defendant." 
If this were so, then the court would not be divested of jurisdiction, it would merely be directed 
as to how it must act procedurally. Instead, the Rule states "no judgment shall be entered against 
a defendant." This language divests the trial court of its subject matter jurisdiction. 
Rule 3:3 is not the only Rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Virginia which is 
jurisdictional in nature and will serve to divest a Court of subject matter jurisdiction. In his 
dissent in Morrison, Justice Poff wrote: 
The rules of this Court requiring notice of the filing of a transcript of the 
proceedings in a trial court are rules governing the procedure to be followed in 
perfecting an appeal to this Court. But they are jurisdictional, and failure to 
comply therewith will result . . . in dismissal, either before or after appeal is 
awarded ... [D]ismissal will continue to be the price of failure to comply with 
mandatory rule provisions." 
Morrison at 175, note 1, 387 S.E.2d at 758 (J. Poff, dissenting) (citing Towler v. Commonwealth, 
216 Va. 533, 535, 221 S.E.2d 119, 121 (1976) (emphasis added)). 
The plaintiff will likely argue that she has a statutory right to one voluntary nonsuit and 
will likely rely upon the Supreme Court's holding in McManama v. Plunk, 250 Va. 27, 458 
S.E.2d 759 (1995), to support this argument. The Court in that case narrowly addressed the 
specific constitutional question of whether the defendant had a constitutional due process right 
in the defense of the statute of limitations and the time limits of Rule 3 :3. The trial court below 
had ruled that the nonsuit entered in that case had the effect of being a dismissal order entered 
"without determining the merits" such that the tolling provisiqns of Virginia Code Section 8.01-
299(E)(1) governed the tolling of the statute of limitations. The trial court based its ruling on 
5 
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the fact that the defendant had not been served with process and had thus been deprived the due 
process right to be heard at a hearing regarding entry of the nonsuit order. Based upon this 
ruling, the trial court found that the plaintiffs second Motion for Judgment was untimely and 
thus the defendant had a valid statute of limitations defense. The Supreme Court reversed the 
trial court finding that the defendant had no such due process right, thus the nonsuit had been a 
nonappealable nonsuit subject to the applicable six-month extension of the statute of limitations 
granted by Virginia Code Section 8.01-299(E)(3). 
It is important to note that the defendants do not contest that the plaintiff h~s a statutory 
right to a nonsuit. Rule 3:3, however, determines whether the court has the jurisdiction or power 
to enter that order of nonsuit. The Court in McManama never addressed this issue but instead 
merely concluded in dicta, without discussion, that "[t]he trial court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over the first action enabling it to properly enter an order granting plaintiff a 
voluntary nonsuit." McManama at 32, 458 S.E.2d at 762. It is precisely this point which is 
contested by the defendants. Based upon the plain meaning of the language contained in Rule 
3:3, the Portsmouth Circuit Court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to enter a nonsuit order 
in this case. Entry of the nonsuit order presumes that the trial court maintained jurisdiction to 
enter an order against the defendants should the plaintiff have chosen to refile her claim. Rule 
3:3 clearly directs that this shall not be the case. Thus, as the Portsmouth court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to enter the nonsuit order, this court now lacks subject matter to enter a 
judgment against these defendants. Accordingly, all claims against these defendants should be 
6 
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dismissed, with prejudice? 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this court should find (1) that the plaintiff failed to timely 
serve the defendants of her first Motion for Judgment as required by Rule 3:3 and Virginia Code 
Section 8.01-275.1, (2) that the Circuit Court for the City of Portsmouth lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to enter the Order of Nonsuit dated April 28, 1997, and (3) that this court now lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claim. Accordingly, this court should enter an 
Order dismissing this case, with prejudice, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 3:3 and the holding 
of the Supreme Court in Gilbreath v. Brewster. 
Carolyn P. Oast, Esq. 
Todd D. Anderson, Esq. 
SANDY BUTLER, MICHELLE MCCORMICK 
JANINE MOONEY, RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL, and 
RIVERSIDE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
By=-r-~o. ~~ 
Counsel 
HEILIG, MCKENRY, FRAIM & LOLLAR, P.C. 
700 Newtown Road 
Norfolk, VA 23502 
(757) 461-2500 
2 The Supreme Court has held that "a dismissal under !Rule 3:3 is a dismissal with 
prejudice." Gilbreath v. Brewster, 250 Va 436, 442, 463 S.E.2d 836, 838 (1995); see also 
Dennis v. Jones, 240 Va. 12, 20, 393 S.E.2d 390, 394 (19QO)j 
7 
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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
LAURIE F.S. WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. Law No.: 26466-RC 
~:~ • ,t. :~~ .~\ 
(.1 ~~"· ,.o J 
:~ -" ~"! :-~ '-.L) 
~·· ~~ :;:~:~~. § 
SPECIAL PLEA OF LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.:AND"' 
. ,. {"-) 
MOTION TO DISMISS \ \ ~;;·~.~ ··.:·~. 
\ \ ·:.:~:. ~ .. :. ~ .. f~ ~~ 
SANDY BUTLER, et al., 
1 • {_-):'\~.. ~ 
COME NOW the defendants, Sandy Butler, Michelle McCormick, ~ariine~oo~y, . ,_:;.:~;; 
\ -\ \-.·.-;, c..,J ;•·.~-~:=-
Riverside Hospital, and Riverside Regional Medical Center, [hereinafter "the D~fe:h~~n. lj'y 
'. .... 
counsel, and move this Honorable Court for entry of an Order dismissing this cake as to these 
defendants on the grounds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs 
claims. As grounds for this Motion, the defendants state as follows: 
1. The plaintiff in this action alleges, in summary, that these defendants were 
negligent in failing to provide pain management services to the plaintiff relative to the birth of 
her daughter between March 14, 1994, and March 17, 1994. The plaintiff originally brought suit 
against these and other defendants by filing a Motion for Judgment, Law No. 96-459, in the 
Circuit Court for the City of Portsmouth on March 18, 1996. 
2. Service of this Motion for Judgment or a Notice of the Motion for Judgment was 
never effected as to any defendant. 
3. On April 28, 1997, the Circuit Court for the City of Portsmouth entered an order 
granting a nonsuit to the plaintiff pursuant to Va. Code § 8. 01-3 80. At this point in time, service 
had never been effected as to any· defendant within 12 months of commencement of the action 
as required by Rule 3:3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court ofVirginia and Va. Code §8.01-275.1. 
000033 
;· 
4. Rule 3:3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia states, in pertinent part, 
that "[N]o judgment shall be entered against a defendant who is served with process more than 
one year after the commencement of the action against him." 
5. Since the plaintiffs first Motion for Judgment had never been served as to the 
above-named defendants as required by Rule 3:3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, 
and Va. Code §8.01-275.1, the Circuit Court for the City of Portsmouth lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim and therefore it lacked jurisdiction to enter the nonsuit order 
of April 28, 1997. 
6. Accordingly, the plaintiffs second Motion for Judgment, currently pending before 
this Court, being filed on or about October 31, 1997, was filed after the applicable statute of 
limitations of two years and the claim is therefore time barred. 
7. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Gilbreath v. Brewster, 250 Va. 436 
(1995), any dismissal under Rule 3:3 ofthe Rules ofthe Supreme Court ofVirginia shall be with 
prejudice. 
WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, and for the reasons included in the 
accompanying Brief in Support of the Special Plea of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and 
Motion to Dismiss, these defendants respectfully request that this Court enter an Order dismissing 
this case, with prejudice, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 3:3 of the Rules of the Supreme 
Court of Virginia, together with such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and 
appropriate. 
SANDY BUTLER, MICHELLE MCCORMICK 
JANINE MOONEY, RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL, and 
RIVERSIDE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
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Carolyn P. Oast, Esq. 
Todd D. Anderson, Esq. 
HEILIG, MCKENRY, FRAIM & LOLLAR, P.C. 
700 Newtown Road 
Norfolk, VA 23502 
(757) 461-2500 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thisdl S~ay of June 1999, I mailed a copy of the Special Plea of 
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss to all counsel of record. 
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Avery T. Waterman, 
' Jr. 
PAITEN, WORNOM & 
WATKINSL.C. 
' 12350 Jeffcrsou Avenue 
Suite360 
Newport News, Virginia 23602 
(757) 249-1881 
VIR~INIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NEWPORT 
NEWS 
LAURIE F. S. WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Law No.: 26466-RC 
SANDY BUTLER, et al., 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S MASTER MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION RE 
10/14/98 PLEAS OF STATUTE OF LIMITATION AND MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS OF J.R.A.A., DR. REIN AND DR. COULEMAN; 
10/20/98 SPECIAL PLEA OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
OF RIVERSIDE AND NURSES BUTLER, MCCORMICK AND MOONEY; 
10/20/98 MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE·AND MOTION TO DISMISS 
OF NURSE MOONEY; AND 
12/23/98 PLEA IN BAR AND MOTION TO DISMISS 
OF DR. COULEMAN 
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: 
Attempting to avoid the merits of the captioned suit for medical malpractice, 
Defendants have filed blunderbuss procedural Pleas and Motions variously conjuring 
late filing and/or service. As a matter of law, all are unfounded - save the Motions 
ofNurse Mooney, which are unfounded as a matter of fact. 
I I . 
. i 
I 
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The following chronology is dispositive: 
(3/14-17/94) Continuing treatment by Defendants.1 
(3/18/96) No. L96-459 filed, and service withheld for fear of job retaliation.2 
(4/28/97) No. L96-459 non-suited.3 
(10/3/97) No. L97-1776 filed, and service withheld for fear of job retaliation. 
(9/16/98) Undersigned substituted as counsel, and requests issuance of notices. 
(9/22/98) Clerk issues notices. 
(9/24-26/98) Notices delivered to process servers with assurance of timely service. 
(10/8/98) Service on Nurse Mooney, after unsuccessful attempt in North Carolina. 
A. Filing of Suit is Timely: 
Plaintiff alleges continuing (mis )treatment by Defendants through at least 
March 17, 1994. Defendants concede that personal injury suits can be filed 2 years 
after medical malpractice. See, e.g., Section 8.01-243(A) ofthe Code ofVirginia. 
It is well-settled that under the so-called "continuing treatment" rule, 2 years is 
counted from the last date of treatment. See, e.g., Fenton v. Danaceau, 220 Va. 1 
(1979). When the last day of the 2 years falls on a Saturday or a Sunday, then the 
deadline for filing is not until Monday. See, e.g, Section 1-13.3:1 of the Code of 
Virginia; Ward v. INA, 253 Va. 232 (1997). 
In the matter sub judice, the continuing treatment is alleged through at least 
March 17, 1994. Two years after that is Sunday, March 17, 1996. Suit was filed on 
1Plaintiff actually would show follow-up examination and treatment by Defendants, James 
River Anesthesia Associates ("JRAA"), Dr. Rein and Dr. Couleman, on at least 1 occasion after· 
March17, 1994, in the Operating Room area of Riverside. See, e.g., Exhibit 1, 3/22/94 Progress 
Note. 
2See, Exhibit 2, Initial Motion for Judgment. 
3See, Exhibit 3, Order ofNon-Suit. 
-2-
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Monday, March 18, 1996. That is timely.4 
r 
Plaintiffs are entitled to 1 dismissal without prejudice by non-suit. See, e.g., 
Section 8.01-380 of the Code ofVirginia. Plaintiffs also are entitled to refile a non-
suited claim within 6 months, notwithstanding that more than 2 years have passed 
since accrual, see, e.g., Section 8.01-229(E). of the Code of Virginia; and 
notwithstanding that service was not effected within 1 year prior to non-suit. See, 
e.g., Clark v. Butler, 238 Va. 506 (1989). 
In the matter sub judice, Plaintiff non-suited on April28, 1997. Plaintiff then 
re-filed 5 months and 5 days later on October 3, 1997. That too is timely. 
B. Service of Process is Timely: 
Plaintiff did not serve the initial suit during the 1 year, 1 month and 10 days 
that it was pending prior to non-suit. That suit was not dismissed with prejudice for 
lack of service; service was never reached or even raised in that action. 
Ten years ago, the Supreme Court of Virginia cut down the thin reed of 
Defendants. Reading Section 8:01-380 and its Rule 3:3 in pari materia, the Court 
held on point that Plaintiffs statutory right of non-suit andre-filing "trumped" an 
unadjudicated lack of service. See, e.g., Clark v. Butler, 238 Va. 506 (1989). 
Defendants acknowledge that Section 8.01-275.1 of the Code of Virginia merely 
codifies Rule 3 :3. See, e.g., 1 0/20/98 Motion to Quash and to Dismiss of Nurse 
Mooney at 1. 
IIi the matter sub judice, only Nurse Mooney complains that she was served 
late upon re-filing - 1 year and 5 days. However, Nurse Mooney effectively 
concedes that failure to effect service within 1 year is not fatal per se, that the same 
simply invokes the discretion of the Court as a matter of fact. Under the unusual 
circumstances of this case, due diligence was exercised in the face of potential job 
retaliation, substitution of counsel difficulties, out-of-state changes of address, and 
process server shortcomings. 
4lndeed, even if the date of last treatment was March 16, 1994, the filing on Monday, March 
18, 1996, still would be timely. i , ! 
-3-
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WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays the Court overrule all Pleas and deny any 
Motipns of Defendants; and award Plaintiff reasonable attorneys fees for having to 
respond to numerous unfounded pleadings. 
Avery J'. Waterman, Jr., Esq. 
VSBNo. 27118 
Patten, Womom & Watkins, L.C. 
12350 Jefferson Ave., Suite 360 
Ne~ort News; Virginia 23602 (757) 223-455:> 
-4-
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Respectfully submitted, 
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VIRGINIA: IN TilE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
' lAURIE F. S. WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SANDY BUTLER, 
MICHELLE ''ROE", 
JANINE MOONEY, 
RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL, 
AT lAW NUMBER: 
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A TRIAL BY JURy 
RIVERSIDE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
. . 
NAN COULEMAN, 
PAUL REIN, 
and 
JAMES RIVER ANESTIIESIA ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned hereby moves the Circuit Court of the City 
of Portsm~uth, Virginia, at the Courthouse th~reof for a judgment and award against the 
defendants, SANDY BUTLER, MICHELLE "ROE", JANINE MOONEY, RIVERSIDE 
HOSPITAL,RIVERSIDEREGIONALMEDICALCENTER,NANCOULEMAN,PAUL 
REIN, and JAMES RIVER ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, INC., jointly and severally, for 
. . 
r. ~~iao.!aREJT the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND ($200,000.00) DOLLARS with interest and 
lffolk, ViqiDia 23510 
costs for the following, to-wit: 
/'UJ 000041. 
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orfolk, V"arginia 23510 
COUNT I 
1. That at all relevant times, Sandy Butler, was a pain management technician 
duly licensed to practice under the laws of the Commonwealth of Vrrginia, and was acting 
as the agent and employee of the defendants, Riverside Hospital and Riverside Regional 
Medical Center, and within the course and scope of~her employment, and the acts of the 
defendant, Sandy Butler, are imputed to the defendants, Riverside Hospital and Riverside 
Regional Medical Center. 
2. That at all times relevant hereto the defendant, Sandy Butler, was acting as 
the agent and employee of the defendants, Riverside Hospital and Riverside Regional 
i 
Medical Center, and within the course and scope of her employment. 
3. That for a period of time commencing March _14, 1994 through March 17, 
1994, the defendant was employed by plaintiff, for compensation, to skillfully and carefully 
provide pain management services to her relative to the birth of her daughter. 
4. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that she failed 
to exercise or possess that reasonable degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised or 
possessed by similar practitioners in the City of Portsmouth and or in like areas in the 
Commonwealth of Vrrginia. That the negligence of the defendant, includes but is not 
limited to, negligently failing to administer proper pain management treatment to the 
plaintiff, causing inflltrations and other damages. 
5. That in treating the plaintiff, the de(endant was negligent in that she failed 
to properly treat and follow the plaintiff, all in vio1ation of the standard of care of similar 
practitioners. 
/2,1 000042 
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6. That the defendant knew or should have known of the risks of the type of 
treatment she gave to the plaintiff and failed to properly administer the pain management 
treatment. After the plaintiffs complaints and problems became known or should have 
become known, the defendant failed to follow the appropriate standard of care, all of which 
proximately caused her injuries. 
7. That as a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence, the plaintiff, 
Laurie F. S. Waterman, has sustained pain, suffering, permanent injury and disfigurement, 
medical and loss of earnings and in the future will be caused to suffer great physical pain, 
mental anguish, medical expenses and loss of earnings. 
8. The said injuries will continue to permanently disable her from other 
activities formerly associated with her person and station in life. 
COUNIU 
9. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 8 of the Motion for 
Judgment as if fully set forth herein. 
10. That at all relevant times, Michelle "Roe", was a pain management technician 
duly licensed to practice under the laws of the ·Commonwealth of Virginia, and was acting 
as the agent and employee of the defendants, Riverside Hospital and Riverside Regional 
Medical Center, and within the course and scope of her employment, and the acts of the 
defendant, Michelle "Roe", are imputed to the defendants, Riverside Hospital and Riverside 
Regional Medical Center. 
11. That at all times relevant hereto the defendant, Michelle "Roe", was acting 
as the agent and employee of the defendants, Riverside Hospital and Riverside Regional 
Medical Center, and within the course and scope of her employment. 
000043 
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12. That for a period of time commencing March 14, 1994 through March 17, 
' 1994, the defendant was employed by plaintiff, for compensation, to skillfully and carefully 
provide pain management services to her relative to the birth of her daughter. 
13. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that she failed 
to exercise or possess that reasonable degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised or 
possessed by similar practitioners in the City of Portsmouth and or in like areas in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia. That the negligence of the defendant, includes but is not 
limited to, negligently failing to administer proper pain management treatment to the 
plaintiff, causing infiltrations and other damages. 
14. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that she failed 
to properly treat and follow the plaintiff, all in violation of the standard of care of similar 
practitioners. 
,. 
15. That the defendant knew or should have known of the risks of the type of 
treatment she gave to the plaintiff and failed to properly administer the pain management 
treatment. After the plaintiff's complaints and problems became known or should have 
become known, the defendant failed to follow ·the appropriate standard of care, all of which 
proximately caused her injuries. 
16. That as a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence, the plaintiff, 
Laurie F. S. Waterman, has sustained pain, suffering, permanent injury and disfigurement, 
medical and loss of earnings and in the future will pe caused to suffer great physical pain, 
mental anguish, medical expenses and loss of earnings. 
I 
17. The said injuries will continue to :permanently disable her from other 
activities formerly associated with her person and ,station in life. 
I 
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COUNIW 
' 18. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 17 of the Motion for 
Judgment as if fully set forth herein. 
19. That at all relevant times, J anine Mooney, was a pain management technician . 
duly licensed to practice under the laws of the Commonwealth of Vrrginia, and was acting 
as the agent and employee of the defendants, Riverside Hospital and Riverside Regional 
Medical Center, and within the course and scope of her employment, and the acts of the 
defendant, J anine Mooney, are imputed to the defendants, Riverside Hospital and 
Riverside Regional Medical Center. 
20. That at all times relevant hereto the defendant, J anine Mooney, was acting 
as the agent and employee of the defendants, Riverside Hospital and Riverside Regional 
Medical Center, and within the course and scope of her employment. 
21. That for a period of time commencing March 14, 1994 through March 17; 
1994, the defendant was employed by plaintiff, for compensation, to skillfully and carefully 
provide pain management services to her relative to the birth of her daughter. 
22. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that she failed 
to exercise or possess that reasonable degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised or 
possessed by similar practitioners in the City of Portsmouth and or in like areas in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia. That the negligence of the defendant, includes but is not 
limited to, negligently failing to administer proper pain management treatment to the 
plaintiff, causing infiltrations and other damages. 
000045 
Law Offices Of 
tiT, DRESCHER. I< BREIT 
4orfolk, VirJiaia 23510 
23. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that she failed 
to properly treat and follow the plaintiff, all in violation of the standard of care of similar 
practitioners. 
24. That the defendant knew or should have known of the risks of the type of 
treatment she gave to the plaintiff and failed to properly administer the pain management 
treatment. After the plaintiffs complaints and problems became known or should have 
become known, the defendant failed to follow the appropriate standard of care, all of which 
proximately caused her injuries. 
25. That as a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence, the plaintiff, 
Laurie F. S. Waterman, has sustained pain, suffering, permanent injury and disfigurement, 
medical and loss of earnings and in the future will be caused to suffer great physical pain, 
mental anguish, medical expenses and loss of earnings. 
26. The said injuries will continue to permanently disable her from other 
activities formerly associated with her person and station in life. 
COUNT IV 
27. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 26 of the Motion for 
Judgment as if fully set forth herein. 
28. Upon information and belief, the defendant, Riverside Hospital, is a 
corporation organized and under the laws of the Commonwealth of Vrrginia, with its 
principal office and place of business in Newport News, Virginia, and which regularly 
solicits business in the City of Portsmouth, Vrrginia. Riverside Hospital is a corporation 
regularly doing business according to the appropriate statutes in the Commonwealth of 
/2S 
000046 
aw Offices Of 
>RESCHER. I< BREIT 
lk, Virginia 23510 
Virginia, City of Portsmouth, and is subject to and within the jurisdiction and venue of this 
Honorable Court. 
29. That at all relevant times, ~verside Hospital, was a medical care facility duly 
licensed to practice under the laws Qf the Commonwealth of Virginia 
30. That for a period of time commencing March 14, 1994 through March 17, 
1994, the defendant was employed by plaintiff, for compensation, to skillfully and carefully 
provide medical care services to her relative to the birth of her daughter. 
31. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that it failed to 
exercise or possess that reasonable degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised or 
possessed by similar practitioners in the City of Portsmouth and or in like areas in the 
Commonwealth of Vrrginia That the negligence of the defendant, includes but is not 
limited. to, negligently failing to administer proper medical treatment to the plaintiff, 
causing infiltrations and other damages. 
32. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that it failed to 
properly treat and follow the plaintiff, all in violation of the standard of care of similar 
practitioners. 
33. That the defendant knew or should have known of the risks of the type of 
treatment it provided to the plaintiff and failed to properly administer medical care. After 
the plaintiff's complaints and problems became known or should have become known, the 
defendant failed to follow the appropriate standard of care, all of which proximately caused 
her injuries. 
34. That as a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence, the plaintiff, 
Laurie F. S. Waterman, has sustained pain, suffering, permanent injury and disfigurement, 
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medical and loss of earnings and in the future will be caused to suffer great physical pain, 
I 
· mental anguish, medical expenses and loss of earnings .. 
35. The said injuries will continue to permanently disable her from other 
activities formerly associated with her person and station in life. 
COUNTY 
36. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 35 of the Motion for 
Judgment as if fully set forth herein. 
37. Upon information and belief, the defendant, Riverside Regional Medical 
Center, is a corporation organized and under the laws of the Commonwealth of Vrrginia, 
with its principal office and place of business in Newport News, Vrrginia, and which 
regularly solicits business in the City of Portsmouth, Virginia. Riverside Regional Medical 
Center is a corporation regularly doing business according to the appropriate statutes in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, City of Portsmouth, and is subject to and within the jurisdiction 
and venue of this Honorable Court. 
38. That at all relevant times, Riverside Regional Medical Center, was a medical 
care facility duly licensed to practice under the laws of the Commonwealth of Vrrginia. 
39. ·That for a period of time commencing; March 14, 1994 through March 17, 
1994, the defendant was employed by plaintiff, for compensation, to skillfully and carefully 
provide medical care services to her relative to the birth of her daughter. 
40. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that it failed to 
exercise or possess that reasonable degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised or 
possessed by similar practitioners in the City of Portsmouth and or in like areas in the 
Commonwealth of Vrrginia. That the negligence of the defendant, uiciudes but is not 
/2.-7 000048 
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limited to, negligently failing to administer proper medical treatment to the plaintiff, 
causing infiltrations and other damages. 
' 41. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that it failed to 
properly treat and follow the plaintiff, all in violation of the standard of care of similar 
practitioners. 
42. That the defendant knew or should have known of the risks of the type of · 
treatment it provided to the plaintiff and failed to properly administer medical care. After 
the plaintiff's complaints and problems became known or should have become known, the 
defendant failed to follow the appropriate standard of care, all of which proximately caused 
her injuries. 
43. That as a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence, the plaintiff, 
Laurie F. S. Waterman, has sustained pain, suffering, permanent injury and disfigurement, 
medical and loss of earnings and in the future will be caused to suffer great physical pain, 
mental anguish, medical expenses and loss of earnings. 
44. The said injuries will continue to permanently disable her from other 
activities formerly associated with her person and station in life. 
COUNIYI 
45. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 44 of the Motion for 
Judgment as if fully set forth herein. 
46. That at all relevant times, Nan Couleman, was an anesthesiologist duly 
licensed to practice under the laws of the Commonwealth of Vrrginia, and was acting as the 
agent and employee of the defendant, James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc., and within 
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the course and scope of her employment, and the acts of the defendant, Nan Couleman, 
are im,Puted to the defendant, James River Anesthesia. Associates, Inc. 
47. That at all times relevant hereto the defendant, Nan Couleman, was acting 
. as the agent and employee of the defendant, James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc., and 
within the course and scope of her employment. 
48. That for a peri® of time commencing March 14, 1994 through March 17, 
1994, the defendant was employed by plaintiff, for compensation, to skillfully and carefully 
provide anesthesia services to her relati:ve to the birth of her ~ughter. 
49. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that she fail~d 
to exercise or possess that reasonable degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised or 
possessed by similar practitioners in the City of Portsmouth and or in like areas in the 
Commonwealth of ·v~ginia. That the negligence of the defendant, includes but is not 
limited to, negligently failing to properly administer anesthesia· to the plaintiff, causing 
infiltrations and other damages. 
SO. That in treating the plaintiff, the defend~t was negligent in that she failed 
to properly treat and follow the plaintiff, all in violation of the standard of care of similar 
practitioners. 
51. That the defendant knew or should have known of the risks of the type of 
treannent she gave to the plaintiff and failed to properly administer the anesthesia. After 
the plaintiffs complaints and problems became kn()"Wn or should have become known, the 
defendant failed to follow the appropriate standard of care, all of which proximately caused 
her injuries. 
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52. That as a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence, the plaintiff, 
Laurit; F. S. Watemian, has sustained pain, suffering, permanent injwy and disfigurement, 
medical and loss of earnings and in the future will be ca~ to suffer great physical pain, 
mental anguish, medical expenses and loss of earnings. 
53. The said injuries will continue to permanently disable her from other 
activities formerly associated with her person and station in life. 
COUNIVI 
54. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 53 ~f the Motion for 
Judgment as if fully set forth herein. 
55. That at all relevant times, Paul Rein, was an anesthesiologist duly licensed 
to practice under the laws of the Commonwealth of V1rginia, and was acting as the agent 
and employee of the defendant, James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc., and within the 
course and scope of his employment, and the acts of the defendant, Paul Rein, are imputed 
to the defendant, James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc. 
56. That at all times relevant hereto the defendant, Paul Rein, was acting as the 
agent and employee of the defendant, James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc., and within 
the course and scope of his employment. 
57. That for a period of time commencing March 14, 1994 through March 17, 
. . 
1994, the defendant was employed by plaintiff," for compensation, to skillfully and carefully 
provide anesthesia services to her relative to the birth of her daughter. 
58. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that he failed to 
exercise or possess that reasonable degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised or 
possessed by similar practitioners in the City of Portsmouth and or in like areas in the 
000051. 
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Commonwealth of Vrrginia. That the negligence of the defendant, includes but is not 
limite4 to, negligently failing to properly administer anesthesia to the plaintiff, causing 
. . 
infiltrations and other damages. 
59. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that he failed to 
properly treat and follow the· plaintiff, all in violation of the standard of care of similar 
practitioners. 
60. That the defendant knew or should have known of the risks of the type of 
treatment he gave to the plaintiff and f~ed to properly administer the anesthesia After 
the plaintiffs complaints and problems became known or should have become known, the 
defendant failed to follow the appropriate standard of care, all of which proximately caused 
her injuries. 
61. That as a direct and proximate result of d.efendant's negligence, the plaintiff, 
Laurie F. S. Waterman, has sustained pain, suffering, permanent injury and disfigurement, 
medical and loss of earnings and in the future will be, caused to suffer great physical pain, 
mental anguish, medical expenses and loss of earnings. 
62. The said injuries will continlte. to pet:manently disable her from other 
activities formerly associated with her person and station in life. 
COUNIVIU 
63. Plaintiff· repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 62 of the Motion for 
Judgment as if fully set forth herein. 
64. Upon information and belief, the qefendant, James River Anesthesia 
Associates, Inc., is a corporation organized and under the la'WS of the Commonwealth of 
Vrrginia, with its principal office and place of business in Newport N~, Virginia, and 
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which regularly solicits business in the City of Portsmouth, Vrrginia. James River 
Anesili;esia Associates, Inc. is a corporation regularly doing business according to the 
appropriate statutes in the Commonwealth of Vrrginia, City of Portsmouth, and is subject 
to and within the jurisdiction and venue of this Honorable Court. 
65. That at all relevant times, James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc., was a 
medical care provider duly licensed to practice under the laws of the Commonwealth of 
Vrrginia. 
66. That for a period of time commencing March 14, 1994 through March 17, 
1994, the defendant was employed by plaintiff, for compensation, to skillfully and carefully 
provide medical care services to her relative to the birth of her daughter. 
67. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that it failed to 
exercise or possess that reasonable degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised or 
possessed by similar practitioners in the City of Portsmouth and or in like areas in the 
Commonwealth of Vrrginia. That the negligence of the defendant, includes but is not 
limited to, negligently failing to administer proper medical treatment to the plaintiff, 
causing infiltrations and other damages. 
68. That in treating the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in that it failed to 
properly treat and follow the plaintiff, all in violation of the standard of care of similar 
practitioners. 
69. That the defendant knew or should have known of the risks of the type of 
treatment it provided to the plaiDtiff and failed to properly administer medical care. After · 
the plaintiffs complaints and. problems became known or should have beCQme known, the 
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defendant failed to follow the appropriate standard of care, all of which proximately caused 
her injuries. 
r 
70. That as a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence, the plaintiff, 
Laurie F. S. Waterman, has sustained pain, suffering, permanent injury and disfigurement, 
medical and loss of earnings and in the future will be caused to suffer great physical pain, 
mental anguish, medical expenses and loss of earnings. 
71. The said injuries will continue to permanently disable her from other 
activities formerly associated with her person and station in life. 
72. That by reason of and as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of 
all of the defendant's SANDY BU1LER, MICHELLE "ROE", JANINE MOONEY, 
RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL, RIVERSIDE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, NAN 
COULEMAN, PAUL REIN, and JAMES RIVER ANESTHESIA ASSOCIA1ES, INC., 
individually and collectively, in breaching the duty of care owed to the plaintiff by providing 
substandard anesthesia and pain management treatment continuously and without 
substantial interruption during March 14 - March 17, 1994, the plaintiff was caused to suffer 
infiltrations and other damages such as. corre~e surgeries, lost earnings and continued 
pain, suffering and inconvenience. 
73. That by reason of and as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of 
the defendant's, SANDY BUTLER, MICHELLE ''ROE", JANINE MOONEY, 
RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL, RIVERSIDE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, NAN 
COULEMAN, PAUL REIN, and JAMES RIVER ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, INC., 
jointly and severally, the plaintiff bas sustained damages in the amount of TWO 
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HUNDRED THOUSAND ($200,000.00) DOLLARS, representing damages for the 
negligence aforesaid 
. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff moves this Honorable Court for a judgment against the 
defendants, SANDY BUTLER, MicHELLE ''ROE", JANINE MOONEY, RIVERSIDE 
HOSPITAL,RIVERSIDEREGIONALMEDICALCENTER,NANCOULEMAN,PAUL 
REIN, and JAMES RIVER ANESTHESIA ASSOCIA 1ES, INC., jointly and severally, in 
the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($200,000.00), with interest 
and costs aforesaid 
ieffrey A Breit 
BREIT, DRESCHER & BREIT 
1000 Dominion Tower 
999 Waterside Drive 
· Norfolk, VA 23510 
(804) 622-6000 
.~. .•·· 
' 
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Of Counsel 
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f1 
Law Offices Of 
:IT. DRESCHER. I< BREIT 
lorfolk. VirgiJiia 23510 
.·-.. 
" VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
LAURIE F. S. WATERMAN, 
' 
Plaintiff, 
v. AT LAW NUMBER: L96-459 
SANDY BUTLER, 
MICHELLE "ROE", 
JANINE MOONEY, 
RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL, 
RIVERSIDE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
NAN COULEMAN, 
PAUL REIN, 
and 
JAMES RIVER ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF NON-SUIT 
THIS MA TIER comes before the Court on the motion of the plaintiff, by counsel, 
for leave to non-suit this action pursuant to Section 8.01-380 of the Code of Virginia of 
1950, as amended. 
IT APPEARING to the Court that there has been no service on the defendants in 
this matter nor has any appearance been made by any of the defendants or by anyone 
acting on their behalf regarding this matter, the plaintiff is hereby granted leave to take a 
voluntary non-suit as to each and all of the defendants, without prejudice, in accordance 
with Section 8.01-380 of the Code of Virginia of 1950, as amended. 
ACCORDINGLY, this matter is ENDED and removed from the docket of this 
Court. 2/; 71 
L.fl I A copy Teste: Walter M. Edmonds, Clerk ot the Circuit -~7~--~ 
- . 
.. • 
Law Offices Of 
IT. DRESCHER. & BREIT 
Corfalk. Virgillia Z3510 
' 
. J efvy A. Breit, p.q. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
' I herebY. certify that the foregoing Plaintiffs' Master Memorandum in 
O_pposition re 10114/98 Pleas of Statute ofLimitation and Motions to Dismiss of 
J .R.A.A., Dr. Rein and Dr. Couleman; 10/20/98 S_p~cial Plea of Statute ofLimitations 
ofRiverside and Nurses Butler, McCormick and Mooney; 10/20/98 Motion to Quash 
Service and Motion to Dismiss of Nurse Mooney; ana 12/23/98 Plea in Bar and 
Motion to Dismiss ofDr. Couleman was sent bY. first class mail this 22nd day of June, 
1999, to Gerald R. Walsh, Esq~ Suite 200 4020 University Drive Fairfax,_ VA 
22030-6802, and to Caro~ P. Oast Esg., Heilig, McKenry, Fraim & Lollar, P.C., 
700 Newtown Road, Norfolk, VA 2,j502. 
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PORTSMOUTH CIRCUIT COURT - LAW 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
SPECIAL PROCESS SERVER 
IN THE PORTSMOUTH CIRCUIT COURT - LAW 
CASE NO. 740CL97001776-00 
SERVICE NO. 007 
SERVICE FILED: 10/03/97 
LAURIE F. S. WATERMAN VS SANDY BUTLER 
SERVICE ON: ATTY NAME: 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
SPECIAL PROCESS SERVER 
IN THE PORTSMOUTH CIRCUIT COURT - LAW 
LAURIE F. S. WATERMAN 
NELSON L. ST. CLAIR JR. 
F;;EG· I STEF;:ED {:lGEi\!T 
RIVERSIDE REGIONAL MEDICAL CTR 
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NEWPORT NEWS, VA 2360~ 
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PORTSMOUTH VIRGINIA 23705 
SPECIAL PROCESS SERVER 
IN THE PORTSMOUTH CIRCUIT COURT - LAW 
LAURIE F. S. WATERMAN 
NELSON L. ST. CLAIR JR. 
REGISTERED AGENT 
RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL INC. 
500 J. CLYDE MORRIS BLVD. 
NEWPORT NEWS, VA 23601 
740CL97001776-00 
SERVICE FILED: 10/03/97 
~~TTY i\!i::li'1E: 
AVERY T. WATERMAN, JR. 
RETURNS SHALL BE MADE HEREON, SHOWING SERVICE OF NOTICE ISSUED SEPTEMBER 22, 
1998 WITH A COPY OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT FILED OCTOBER 03, 1997 ATTACHED: 
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IN THE PORTSMOUTH CIRCUIT COURT - LAW 
CASE NO. 740CL97001776-00 
SERVICE NO. 005 
~AURIE F& S. WATERMAN VS SANDY BUTLER 
SERVICE ON: ATTY NAME: 
P{~UL f(EIN AVERY T. WATERMAN, JR. 
12420 WARWIDK BLVD . 
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SPECIAL PROCESS SERVER 
lN THE PORTSMOUTH CIRCUIT COURT - LAW 
CASE NO. 740CL97001776-00 
SERVICE NO. 004 
SERVICE FILED: 10/03/97 
LAURIE~. S. WAl.ERMAN VS SANDY BUTLER 
SERVICE ON: ATTY NAME: 
AVERY T. WATERMAN. !:··, · .• )i''., •.• 
12420 WARWIDK BLVD. 
SUITE 7D 757-249-t881 
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V I R G I N I A: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
LAURIE F. S. WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Law No. 26466-RTW ~ -< 
rr- rr• j" ~.: 
! 1"'1 
! 
SANDY BUTLER, et al., 
..... -· ;• 
·::: 
Defendants. ;--.,p·, ~~~ .. ~: 
:i:~ 
! t,/'! :-:: 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW OF DEFENDAN:r;s I ~ ~ 
PAUL REIN, M.D. AND NANCY COULEMAN! ~. ~·o 
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR SPECIAL PLE~ T~ x~ 
DISMISS ON THE GROUNDS THAT / ~ 
THIS ACTION IS TIME BARRED ' 
I..D 
I..D 
:,0. 
c: 
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An action, although commenced within the time required, 
must still be served timely in order to provide the legal basis 
for a court to have jurisdiction sufficient to support a 
judgment in the plaintiff's favor. 
Defendants Rein and Couleman assert in their respective 
Pleas that the plaintiff's case at bar has not been timely 
served as required by law and therefore should be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
The plaintiff first commenced her ~ction in Portsmouth on 
March 18, 1996. It, like the one now at issue in this 
dispositive Plea, alleges defendants Rein and Couleman were 
negligent in the period from March 14 through March 17, 1994. 
The original action was never served and on April 28, 1997 
(more than thirteen months after it was commenced), it was 
dismissed without prejudice by a Nonsuit Order obtained ex 
parte. 
The instant action was commenced in Portsmouth on October 
3, ~997, less than six months after the April 28, 1997 Nonsuit. 
The plaintiff's position is that Va. Code § 8.01-380 applies and 
that this action commenced within six months of the ex parte 
nonsuit is not time barred for any reason. 
It is the defendants' position that the provisions of Va. 
Code § 8.01-275.1 are controlling in this matter and the case 
law relied upon by the plaintiff is not applicable in view of 
the procedural history of this action. 
Virginia Code § 8.01-275.1, which became law on July 1, 
1994, states 
When service of process is timely. -
Service of process in an action or suit within 
twelve months of commencement of the action or 
suit against a defendant shall be timely as to 
that defendant. Service of process on a defendant 
more than twelve months after the suit or action 
was commenced shall be timely upon a finding by 
the court that the plaintiff exercised due 
diligence to have timely service made on the 
defendant. 
These defendants do not agree with the notion that Code § 8.01-
275.1 is merely a codification of part of Rule 3:3. 1 The Rule 
and the Code are simply not the same in their language or 
purpose. The legislature enacted § 8.01-275.1 for a specific 
purpose and it was not simply to make part of Rule 3:3(c) a law. 
A careful look at § 8.01-275.1 will disclose that it 
contains two separate points. The first point, found in the 
1Rule 3:3(c) - No judgment shall be entered against a 
defendant who was served with process more than one year after 
the commencement of the action against him unless the court 
finds as a fact that the plaintiff exercised due diligence to 
have timely service on him. 
00006G 
first sentence is that service of process shall be timely if 
served on a defendant before twelve months passes after the 
action is commenced. This is the legislature's pronouncement 
that as a generalized matter a plaintiff's action is time barred 
if not served before twelve months pass after commencement of 
the case. 
The statute's second point, found in its second sentence, 
is that in a case where service of process is not timely, unless 
the court finds as a fact that the plaintiff exercised due 
diligence to obtain timely service, the plaintiff's case will be 
considered untimely and not viable. This second point is 
similar in impact to the language of the last sentence of Rule 
3:3(c). 
The most likely reason the legislature used the language 
found in the first sentence of the statute was because it 
intended such language to describe "When service of process is 
timely." The point is clear that if service is made more than 
twelve months after the action is commenced, it is out of time 
and there is no jurisdiction in the court to do anything except 
make a finding whether the plaintiff exercised due diligence to 
have "timely service" made on the defendant, in which event the 
bar to proceeding to judgment is raised. 
Since there is no due diligence to be demonstrated in this 
case, the court is required by the statute to declare that the· 
service of process in this action is out of time, of no effect 
and the action should proceed no further. 
000067 
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At the present time, the last sentence of Rule 3:3(c} 
remains unchanged and § 8.01-275.1 is law. This situation 
brings into play Code § 8.01-3, which deals with the effect of 
subsequent enactments of the General Assembly on Rules of Court. 
This statute states: 
D. Effect of subsequent enactments of 
the General Assembly on Rules of Court. -
The General Assembly may, from time to time, 
by the enactment of a general law, modify, or 
annul any rules adopted or amended pursuant to 
this section. In the case of any variance 
between a rule and an enactment of the 
General Assembly such variance shall be 
construed so as to give effect to such 
enactment. 
It appears that the General Assembly enacted § 8.01-275.1 
due to its concerns about the conflicts being presented to the 
courts regarding Rule 3:3, Code §§ 8.01-380, and 8.01-229(E} (3} 
as discussed in Clark v. Butler Aviation, 238 Va. 506, 511 
{1989). 
The General Assembly enacted § 8.01-275.1 to resolve the 
conflict and not continue it. The application of § 8.01-275.1 
to the facts in this case requires a different result in this 
matter then the outcome in Butler, which involved Rule 3:3 and 
not the statute. 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants Rein and Couleman 
request the court to grant their Pleas and dismiss this action 
with prejudice. 
PAUL REIN, M.D. 
NANCY COULEMAN, M.D. 
By Counsel 
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GERALD R. WALSH, P.C. 
4020 University Drive 
Suite 200 
Fairfax, Virginia 22030 
(703) 385-6162 
By: 
Va. State Bar No. 8157 
Counsel for Defendants 
Paul Rein, M.D. 
Nancy Couleman, M.D. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Memorandum of 
Law of Defendants Paul Rein, M.D. and Nancy Couleman, M.D. in 
support of Their Special Plea to Dismiss on the Grounds that 
this Action is Time Barred was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
~~y of August, 1999 to Avery T. Waterman, Jr., Esq., 
Patten, Wornom & Watkins, L.C., 12350 Jefferson Avenue, Suite 
360, Newport News, Virginia 23602, counsel for plaintiff; and 
Carolyn P. Oast, Attorney at Law, Heilig, McKenry, Fraim and 
Lollar, P.c., Stoney Point Center, 700 Newtown Road, Norfolk, 
Virginia 23502-3999, counsel for defendants. 
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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
LAURIE F.S.'WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. Law No.: 26466-RC 
SANDY BUTLER, et al., 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE SPECIAL PLEA OF LACK OF 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY 
DEFENDANTS RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL, RIVERSIDE REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, SANDY BUTLER, MICHELLE McCORMICK, AND JANINE MOONEY 
COME NOW the defendants, Riverside Hospital, Riverside Regional Medical Center, Sandy 
Butler, Michelle McCormick, and Janine Mooney, by counsel, and submit this Supplemental Brief 
in Support of their Special Plea and Motion to Dismiss. This brief will serve to supplement the 
Special Plea and Motion previously filed, the defendants' Brief in Support previously filed, and oral 
argument presented to the Court at the hearing of August 18, 1999. 
The issue presented by the defendants' Special Plea and Motion to Dismiss is whether this 
Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claim and the authority to render judgment 
against these defendants. An analysis of Rule 3:3 and recent caselaw is contained in the defendants' 
previously filed brief, which is periodically referenced herein. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
Rule 3 :3 states that " [ n ]o judgment shall be entered against a defendant who was served with 
process more than one year after the commencement of the action against him unless the court finds 
as a fact that the plaintiff exercised due diligence to have timely service on him." While it has most 
likely been presumed that "timely service" as mentioned in the latter part of the Rule refers to service 
000070 
within one year, "timely service" was never specifically defined. The legislature addressed this 
oversight by p'assing Virginia Code Section 8.01-275.1 which specifically defmes "timely service." 
Interestingly, the legislature did not include language identifying the remedy a defendant might seek 
when service was untimely. This is because the remedy is already set forth in Rule 3:3 of the Rules 
of the Supreme Court. Virginia Code Section 8.01-271 states that "[s]ubject to the provisions of 
[Title 8.01], pleadings shall be in accordance with Rules of the Supreme Court." Thus, with regard 
to pleadings, the Code and the Rules are to be read in conjunction. Code Section 8.01-275.1 
clarified Rule 3:3, which lacked a clear defmition of "timely service," and proscribed those 
circumstances under which service would be deemed timely and hence not subject to dismissal 
pursuant to Rule 3:3. As argued in these Defendant's previously filed brief, the language of Rule 3:3 
not only mandates dismissal, it divests the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction in that it 
commands that "[n]o judgment shall be rendered" against a defendant who is not timely served. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia has never addressed the argument that Rule 3:3 divests a trial 
court of subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, those cases addressing the impact and reach of Rule 3:3 
have all addressed other very specific arguments and are distinguishable. See Defendants' Brief in 
Support, previously filed. In the case at bar, the plaintiff alleges that the court's ~ecision in this case 
should be governed by the Supreme Court's ruling in Clark y. Butler, 238 Va. 506 (1989). However, 
Clark, which was decided prior to the enactment of Code Section 8.01-275.1, is distinguishable as 
stated above. 
As in the case in bar, the plaintiff in Clark v. Butler failed to serve the defendant with Notice 
of the Motion for Judgment within one year of filing suit. The plaintiff nonsuited and refiled after 
the statute of limitations on the underlying claim had expired. The trial court dismissed the 
2 
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plaintiffs claim pursuant to Rule 3:3. In overturning the trial court, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
attempted to 'reconcile what it perceived as a "dichotomy" between Rule 3:3, which states that no 
judgment shall be entered against a defendant who is not timely served, and the tolling provisions 
ofVirginia Code Section 8.01-229(E)(3), which toll the statute oflimitations during the pendency 
of the initial nonsuited action and grant the plaintiff, at a minimum, six months in which to refile 
following nonsuit. 
The concern expressed by the Court was that if process was not served within one year of 
filing suit, "a nonsuit would be ineffective except to bring an end to that action [and] the running of 
the statute of limitations would continue unabated." Clark, 23 8 Va. at 511. The Court concluded 
that this would create a conflict between Rule 3:3 and Code Section 8.01-229(E)(3). However, the 
Court never addressed, and was apparently never presented with, the proposition that Rule 3:3 
operates to divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. If Rule 3:3 so operates, then the 
plaintiffs statutory right to one nonsuit pursuant to Virginia Code Section 8.01-380 is irrelevant. 
Once a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, a nonsuit does not save the suit for another day. The 
nonsuit, and its corresponding tolling provisions, operate only with regard to the statute of 
limitations. The court's jurisdictional authority to decide the issues in the case, or render judgment 
against the defendant, is entirely separate, and once negated by the operative language of Rule 3:3, 
a plaintiffs statutory right to a nonsuit is irrelevant. Hence, there is no conflict between Rule 3:3 
and the tolling provisions of Section 8.01-229(E)(3), and the Court's decision in Clark v. Butler is 
not implicated. This solution to the "dichotomy" referenced by the Court was never presented and, 
hence, has never been ruled upon .. 
CONCLUSION 
3 
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None ofthe cases in which the Supreme Court has ruled on the reach of Rule 3:3 have 
addressed the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. As such, those decisions do not provide 
controlling authority with regard to this issue. Close analysis of Rule 3:3 and its interaction with 
Virginia Code Section 8.01-275.1 indicate a legislative intent to bar claims which are not timely 
served. This is accomplished through the operative language of Rule 3:3 which states "no judgment 
shall be entered" against a defendant not timely served. Reading this Rule to divest the trial court 
of jurisdiction does not create a conflict between the Rules and Code as the Court mentioned in 
Clark v. Butler. To the contrary, reading the Rules and the Code as operating together-to effect this 
legislative intent promotes justice and consistency in the law. Therefore, this Court should find that 
the Portsmouth Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the nonsuit order in this case 
and that this court now lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment against this defendant. 
· Accordingly the Court should grant these defendants' Special Plea and dismiss the plaintiffs case 
as to these defendants, with prejudice. 
Carolyn P. Oast, Esq. 
Todd D. Anderson, Esq. 
SANDY BUTLER, MICHELLE MCCORMICK 
JANINE MOONEY, RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL, and 
RIVERSIDE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
By:~Q~ 
Counsel .... 
HEILIG, MCKENRY, FRAIM & LOLLAR, P.C. 
700 Newtown Road 
Norfolk, VA 23502 
(757) 461-2500 
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! 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE [ 
I hereby certify that on this~~y of August, 1999, I mailed a copy of the foregoing to all 
counsel of record. 
I 
.. I 
I 
I 
I 
• 
; ·: 
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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NEWPORT 
NEWS 
LAURIE F. S. WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SANDY BUTLER, et al., 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO SPECIAL PLEA OF LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
OF DEFENDANTS, RIVERSIDE AND NURSES, 
AND TO SPECIAL PLEA TO DISMISS 
OF DEFENDANTS, DR. REIN AND DR. COULEMAN 
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: 
On June 22, 1999, Plaintiff filed Master Memorandum in Opposition to Pleas, 
Motions to Dismiss and Motion to Quash; and on June 25, 1999, Plaintiff filed 
Memorandum in Opposition to Special Plea of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff reiterates the legal authority and arguments therein as dispositive. 
In the face of this Court appreciating the state of the controlling law, i.e., that 
Plaintiffs statutory right of non-suit and refiling "trumps" unadjudicated lack of 
service, Defendants are ~eft to conjure a supposed dichoton;ty between Section ~.0 1-
275.1 of the Code of Virginia and Rule 3:3 of the Supreme Court of Virginia. 
Previously, the defense acknowledged that Section 8.01-275.1 was a mere 
codification of Rule 3:3. See, e.g., 10/20/98 Motion to Quash and to Dismiss of 
Nurse Mooney at 1. And direct comparison of the two readily confrrms that the 
statute merely makes explicit what already is implicit in the rule: service of process 
within a year of filing is timely per se and thereafter is timely only upon the Court 
finding due diligence was exercised. 
000075 
' I 
Significantly, Section 8.01-275.1 is totally silent as to non-suits! 
Corr~spondingly, there is absolutely no legislative history behind the new statute that 
purports to change the law of non-suits "trumping" lack of service. Defendants' 
hypotheses that Section 8.01-275.1 somehow eviscerated Clark v. Butler, 238 Va . 
. 506 (1989) is nothing but self-serving, wishful thinking. Indeed, McNamara v. 
Plunk, 250 Va.27 (1995), cited by Defendants, reaffirms the non-suit rule of Clark, 
as does another defense citation, Gilbreath v. Brewster, 25 0 Va. 43 6 ( 1995), although 
Plaintiff in the latter suffered a dismissal with prejudice for untimely service because 
a non-suit could not be taken due to a pending counterclaim (which is not the case at 
bar). 
WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays the Court overrule and deny the various dilatory 
pleadings of Defendants at their expense forthwith. 
Avery T. Waterman, Jr., Esq. 
VSB No. 27118 
Patten, Womom & Watkins 
12350 Jefferson Ave., Suite 360 
Ne~ort News, Virginia 23602 
(757) 249-1881 
Respectfully submitted, 
-2-
2 to z. 
oooo~i'G 
... 
Avery T. Waterman, 
Jr. 
PATTEN, WORNOM & 
WATKINSL.C. 
12350 Jeffmon Avenue 
Suite 360 
Newport News, Virginia 23602 
(151) 249-1881 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. I hereby certify that the foregoing Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in 
Opposition to Special Plea of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Defendants, 
Riverside and Nurses, and to Special Plea to Dismiss ofDefendants, Dr. Rein and Dr. 
Couleman was sent by first class mail this 9th day of September, 1999, to Gerald R. 
Walsh, Esq., Suite 200, 4020 University Drive, Fairfax, VA 22030-6802, and to 
Carolyn P. Oast, Esq., Heilig, McKenry, Fraim & Lollar, P.C., 700 Newtown Road,-
Norfolk, VA 23502. 
- 3-
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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
LAURIE F. S. WATERMAN, 
·Plaintiff, 
v. Law No.: 26466-RC 
SANDY BUTLER, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
THIS DAY, August 18, 1999, came the parties, by counsel, on various 
motions filed by each of the parties. Upon the arguments of counsel, and further 
for good cause shown, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as 
follows: 
1. That the defendant, Janine Mooney, is dismissed, with prejudice, by · 
consent. 
2. That the defendant, Riverside Regional Medical Center, is dismissed, 
without prejudice, by way of nonsuit with the approval ofboth the Court and this 
defendant. 
3. That the Motion to Determine Sufficiency of Plaintiff's Answers and 
Objections to Requests for Admissions filed by the defendants, Sandy Butler, 
Michelle McCormick, Janine Mooney, Riverside Hospital, Inc. and Riverside 
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Regional Medical Center, is DENIED as to Nos. 1 and 3-6 and is GRANTED as to 
No. 2, witH the Plaintiff to amend in conformity with her substantive 
representations athearing. 
4. That the Court takes under advisement the Plea of the Statute of 
Limitation, Plea in Bar and Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants, Dr. Nancy 
Couleman, Dr. Paul Rein and James River Anesthesia Associates, Inc., and the 
Special Plea of the Statute ofLimitation, Plea ofLack of Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants, Butler, McCormick, 
Mooney, Riverside Hospital, Inc., and Riverside Regional medical Center. The 
Defendants shall have ten (10) days from the date ofthis hearing within which to 
file a supplemental briefwith regard to this issue. The Plaintiff shall have ten (10) 
days in which to file a reply brief following the filing of any brief by Defendants. 
5. That the Demurrer filed by the defendants, Riverside Hospital, Inc. 
and Riverside Regional Medical Center, is DENIED. 
6. That the Demurrer filed by the defendants, Mooney, McCormick, and 
Butler, is DENIED. 
7. That the Motion to Overrule the plaintiffs objections to 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents and Motion to Compel 
filed by Riverside Regional Medical Center is GRANTED. 
8. That the Motion for Protective Order filed by the defendants, Butler, 
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McCormick, Mooney, Riverside Hospital, Inc. and Riverside Regional Medical 
Center, is GRANTED. The plaintiff may not proceed with the discovery 
depositions of these defendants, until the plaintiff has identified an expert witness 
in nursing and anesthesiology and provided their preliminary opinions and the 
grounds therefor in accordance with Rule 4:l{b)(4)(A)(i) of the Rules of the 
Supreme Court of Virginia. 
9. That the Court defers judgment on the plaintiff's Motion to Compel 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents propounded to the 
defendants, Riverside Hospital, Inc. and Riverside Regional Medical Center. 
10. That the Court defers judgment on the plaintiff's Motion for Leave to 
Amend her Motion for Judgment. 
11. That the Motion to Compel filed by the defendant, Rein, is 
WITIIDRA WN. 
12. That the Motion to Compel filed by the defendants, Butler, 
McCormick, Mooney ·and Riverside Hospital, Inc., is WITIIDRA WN. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
ENTERED on the .J / day of September, 1999, at Newport News, 
I 
Virginia. 
~00080 
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·. .· 
SEEN: 
Todd D. Anderson, Esq., p.d. 
9---QVv~ 
Gerald R. Walsh, Esq., p.d. 
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~£h£ttilf Jjuhlcittl illirnrif 
RANDOLPH T. WEST 
JUDGE 
Mr. Avery T. Waterman, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
OF VIRGINIA 
October 5, 1999 
Mr. Gerald R. Walsh 
Attorney at Law 
2500 WASHINGTON A VENUE 
COURTROOM ONE 
NEWPORT NEWS. VIRGINIA 23607 
(757) 926-8837 
12350 Jefferson Ave., Suite 360 
Newport News, VA 23602 
. 420 Uniyersity Dr., Suite 200 
Fairfax, VA 22030-6802 
Ms. Carolyn P. Oast 
Attorney at Law 
Stoney Point Center 
700 Newtown Rd. 
Norfolk, VA 23502-3999 
RE: Laurie F. S.Waterman v. Sandy Butler, et al 
Law No. 26466-RW 
Dear Counsel: 
On August 18, 1999, the Court heard several motions re the above-captioned 
matter and withheld its decision on the .Plea of Statute of Limitations and Motion to 
Dismiss. 
The facts of this case are that the plaintiff filed her Motion for Judgment in the 
Circuit Court for the City of Portsmouth, Virginia, on March 18, 1996, alleging acts of 
negligence against the defendants in failing to provide pain management services to the 
plaintiff relative to the birth of her daughter between March 14, 1996 and March 17, 
1996. Service of process was never effected against any of the defendants, and, to the 
Court's knowledge none was ever attempted, and on April28, 1997 the original Motion 
for Judgement was non-suited ex parte. Under Virginia Code§ 8.01-229 (E) (3) a new 
suit was re-filed in the Clerk's Office pf the Portsmouth Circuit Court on October· 3, 
1997 and was properly served within the time constraints of Virginia Code § 8.01-275.1. 
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Mr. Avery T. Waterman, Jr. 
Mr. Gerald R. Walsh 
Ms. Carolyn P. Oast 
Page Two 
October 5, 1999 
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The defendants now contend that the plaintiff has not complied with Rule 3:3 
and Virginia Code§ 8.01-275.1. The plaintiff's position is that the instant action of 
Mr. Waterman, which was filed on October 3, 1997, was commenced within six 
months of the ex parte non-suite and is not time barred for any reason. 
The Court must read the Rules of Court and the Virginia State Code together and 
apply each where appropriate. Rule 3:3, Code § 8.01-380 (statutory right to one 
voluntary non-suit), § 8.01-229 (E) (3) (tolling of the statute of limitations for at least 
six months to allow plaintiff tore-file the claim), and§ 8.01-275.1 are at issue in this 
case. 
The Court is of the opinion that the General Assembly enacted Code§ 8.01-375.1 
to eliminate the problems that the Supreme Court had in deciding Clark v. Butler, 228 
Va.506 (1989). Rule 3:3 provides in part •no judgment shall be entered against a 
defendant who is served with process more than one year after the commencement of 
the action against him unless the Court finds as a fact that the plaintiff exercised due 
diligence to have timely service on him". This is a two-pronged test and it must first be 
shown that service was not obtained within the one year time frame after the ,.,. · 
commencement of the action and, second, that the plaintiff exercised due diligence to 
attempt service. It is clear in the facts of this case that no attempt was made to effect 
service after the commencement of action and it is further clear that the defendants had 
no knowledge of the com~enced action. Plaintiff's attorney obtained a non-suit in 
accord with Code§ 8.01-380. Due to the non-suit the plaintiff was not required to give 
evidence to the second prong of Rule 3:3 and show that due diligence was used in 
attempting to perfect service and, therefore, defeats the objective of this rule. Certainly 
the objective of Rule 3:3 and Code§ 8.01-275.i is to provide for timely prosecution of 
law suits and to avoid abuse of the judicial system. Code § 8.01-275.1 in part states 
•service of process on a defendant more than twelve months after the suit or action was 
commenced shall be timely upon a finding by the Court that the plaintiff exercised due 
diligence to have timely service made on the defendant". Therefore, when Rule 3:3 is 
invoked and it is clear that more than twelve months have expired since the· 
commencement of the action, the only authority the Court should have is to determine . 
if due diligence was exercised to have timely service effected on.the defendants. 
oooos3 
Mr. Avery T. Waterman, Jr. 
Mr. Gerald R. Walsh 
Ms. Carolyn P. Oast 
Page Three 
October 5, 1999 
The Court finds that the plaintiff did not effect service within the guidelines of 
Rule 3:3 and Code§ 8.01-275.1 and, therefore, sustains the defendant's Plea of Statute 
of Limitations and Motion to Dismiss. 
The Court requests Ms. Oast to prepare an order in accord with the Court's 
ruling and forward to all counsel for endorsement. The Court would expect this order 
to be within the Court's file within 15 days of the date of this letter. 
Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
RTW:jhs 
Very truly yours, 
Q l/1tdi 7/4{?,1-Rand~IPh ~. West 
Judge 
""· 
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Avery T. Watennan, Jr., 
Esq. 
Patten, Womom, Hatten & 
Diamonstein, L.C. 
12350 Jefferson Avenue 
Suite 360 
,_.. '~News, Vuginia 
23602 
(757) 223-4555 
VIRGINIA: IN THE CffiCIDT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NEWPORT 
NEWS 
LAURIE F. S. WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. Law No.: 26466-RW ';~ ~ '"'"ll 
SANDY BUTLER, et al., -~ ~·~1 ~; ~ , '"'"" 
Defendants. ~ ::r> =6 7·-• '-'> q;._,oo 
,...-'.__,::a r··. -o ··-~ =--~-~?: :z: ~ l I 
Vl f'3 s~ c..., -
~ .. , . • --·-'"'1: 
... _ 'J i: 
,:..-">(-) U1 ~J 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND;Jffi~ARING 
ON 10/5/99 LETTER OPINION 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by undersigned counsel, and moves the Court for 
reconsideration of its letter opinion dated October 5, 1999, based on the attached. 
additional factual information and controlling legal authority in the Memorandum in 
Support filed contemporaneously herewith. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Laurie F. S Wate~··· B~~~M1V\ 
\ . Avery T. Waterman, Jr., Esq. VSB No. 27118 
Patten, Womom, Hatten & Dhunonstein, L.C. 
12350 Jefferson Ave., Suite 360 
Ne~ort News, Virginia 23602 
(757) 223-4555 . 
\ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
, I hereby certify that the foregoing Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and 
Rehearing on 1 0/5/99 Letter Opimon was sent by first class mail this 29th day of 
October, 1999J. to Gerald R. Walsh.;,. Esq., Suite 200,4020 University Drive, Fairfax, 
VA 22030-68u2, and to Carolyn r. Oast, Esg., Heilig, McKenry, "Fraim & Lollar, 
P.C., 700 Newtown Road, Norrolk, VA 2350Z. 
-2-
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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NEWPORT 
NEWS 
LAURIE F. S. WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SANDY BUTLER, et al., 
Defendants. 
Law No.: 26466-RW 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REHEARING 
ON 10/5/99 LETTER OPINION 
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: 
In Clark v. Butler, 238 Va. 506 (1989), the Supreme Court of Virginia 
mandated that a non-suit "trumps" lack of service of an initial action within 1 year. 
At hearing, the Court observed that the foregoing reflected its understanding of the . 
law. 
Defendants then represented that the law of Clark v. Butler had been abrogated 
by statute. Specifically, although they failed to adduce any legislative history 
whatsoever, Defendants claimed that Section 8.01-275.1 of the Code of Virginia 
ushered in a standard different from Rule 3:3 of the Supre111:e Court of Virginia and 
effectively overruled Clark v. Butler. The Court took the matter under advisement~ 
permitting supplemental briefs. 
By letter opinion dated October 5, 1999, the Court ruled in favor of 
Defendants. The lynchpin of the Court's decision was its interpretation that Section 
8.01-275.1 changed the rule oflaw enunciated in Clark v. Butler. The Court also was 
troubled by a supposed lack of claim awareness by Defendants. 
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1. LEGISLATIVEINTENTOFCODESECTIONS.Ol-275.1 WASNOTTO 
· ABROGATETHERULEOFCLARKV.BUTLER,BUTRATHERWAS 
TO KEEP THE LAW UNCHANGED. 
Significantly, Defendants h~ve cited absolutely no legislative history for 
Section 8.01-275.1. Moreover, since Section 8.01-275.1 merely is a paraphrase of 
Rule 3:3, on the face it does not change the law of Clark v. Butler. Indeed, at least 
one Defendant at bar initially conceded candidly that the new statute merely codified 
the Rule. (See, Exhibit 1, 10/20/97 Motion to Quash and to Dismiss ofDefendant, 
Nurse Mooney, at 1.) 
The fact is all legislative history shows that the intent was not to abrogate the 
rule of Clark v. Butler, but rather was to maintain the existing law unchanged. In its 
inception, Section 8.01-275.1 was SenateBi11482 in the 1994 Session of the General 
Assembly. Senate Bill 482 was referred to the Courts of Justice Committee on 
January 25, 1994; was reported from Committee on February 2, 1994; passed the 
House with insignificant amendment, i.e., the addition of only a preposition ("of'), 
on March 9, 1994, to which the Senate agreed on March 10, 1994; and was approved 
as Chapter 519 of the Acts of Assembly on April 9, 1994. (See, e.g., Exhibit 2, 1994 
Journal ofthe Senate ofVirginia at Title Page, 159,201, 344-45, 363-64, 377-78, 
382-84, 1400, 1470, 1472-73, 1827, 1868 and 2236; Exhibit 3, 1994 Acts of the. 
General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia at Title Page and 725-26; and 
Exhibit 4, Section 8.01-275.1 of the Code ofVirginia (1994, as amended).) 
Significantly, Patrons of Senate Bill 482 were Senator Trumbo, et al. (See, 
e.g., Exhibit 2, 1994 Journal of the Senate ofVirginia at 201 and 1472.) The official 
file of the Division ofLegislative Services of the Commonwealth ofVirginia reflects 
the true singular intent behind the legislation in question. By letter dated January 3, . 
-2- 000088 
1994, the Virginia Trial Lawyers Association requested Senator Trumbo to be the 
Patrop for the legislative initiative that became Senate Bill482 and Section 8.01-
27 5 .1. Around that time, the Virginia Supreme Court had-entertained decreasing the 
time period ofRule 3:3 from 12 months to 4 months (as provided under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure). Accordingly, the express legislative intent simply was to 
maintain the existing time of 12 months. (See, Exhibit 5, 10/15/99 Telefax of 
Commonwealth of Virginia Division of Legislative Services to Delegate Allen A. 
Diamonstein.) 
The legislative history of Senate Bill 482 and Code Section 8.01-275.1 is 
devoid of any reference to the rule of Clark v. Butler. Even more generally, it· is 
devoid of any mention of Code Section 8.01-229(E)(3), Section 8.01-380 or "non-
suit". That is to say, just as Defendant Nurse Mooney admitted and Plaintiff 
emphasizes, Section 8.01-275.1 is a mere codification of Rule 3:3; there was· 
absolutely no intent to abrogate or even change the rule of Clark v. Butler vis-a-vis 
a non-suit trumping a lack of service. 
Moreover, subsequent to the enactment of Section 8.01-275.1 in 1994, the 
Supreme Court ofVirginia interpreted and applied Section 8.01-275.1 just as it had 
Rule 3:3 in Clark v. Butler in 1989. In 1995, in Gilbreath v. Brewster, 250 Va. 436 
( 1995), Plaintiff's initial suit was dismissed with prejudice for failure to effect service 
of process within 1 year only because Plaintiff was precluded from taking a non-suit 
due to the pendency of Defendant's counterclaim. "It is the nature of the prior 
dismissal [i.e., without prejudice,] which determines whether the [refiled] actio~'! 
remains viable," 250 Va. at 440, reaffmned Gilbreath. "This Court [in Clark v. 
Butler] held that a violation ofRule 3:3 in the original action could not be used to bar 
prosecution of the refiled action and, therefore, no conflict existed between the Rule 
and the statutes in issue." 250 Va. at 441. The Virginia Supreme Court pronounced, 
-3-
;2 '7 t- oooos9 
"We note that in 1994, the General Assembly enacted Code Section 8.01-275.1, 
whicJt codifies the 1 year service provision of Rule 3 :3." (See, Exhibit 6, Gilbreath, 
supra, at footnote 3( emphasis added).) 
The matter sub judice is on all fours with Clark v. Butler, which is dispositive. 
The mere codification of Rule 3:3 by Section 8.01-275.1 does not alter that 
controlling rule of law. 
Indeed, a second time in 1995, the Supreme Court of Virginia emphatically 
lionized Clark v. Butler as controlling precedent, even where there is an ex parte non-
suit order and Defendant had absolutely no notice of the suit. McNamara v. Plunk, 
250 Va. 27, 33-35 (1995). In McNamara, Plaintiff procured a non-suit by ex parte 
Order 1 year and 2 days after filing, without ever attempting any service of process, 
and then refiled within 6 months. Reversing the trial court for dismissing with 
prejudice the refiled suit, the Virginia Supreme Court explained: 
The trial Court [in the refiled action] erroneously placed [retroactive] 
limitations on the Plaintiff's right to the voluntary non-suit when it ruled that 
Defendant 'must first have had to have been served with process, must have 
been before a Court with jurisdiction over the Defendant's person, and the 
Defendant must have been given notice of hearing and an opportunity to be 
heard.' None of these requirements is found in the applicable statutes, and a 
Court should not add them by judicial fiat. The trial Court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over the first action enabling it to properly enter an order granting 
Plaintiff a voluntary non-suit. Therefore, Plaintiffs non-suit of her first action 
was valid, the. 2 year statute oflimitations was tolled, and the Plaintiff properly 
recommenced her action within 6 months from the date ofthe non-suit·order 
as authorized by Code Section 8.01-229(E)(3). 
250 Va. at 32 (citation omitted). "We have already objected a similar argument in 
Clark ... ," continued the Court in McNamara,"and [we] harmonized an apparent 
conflict between Rule 3:3, Section 8.01-229(E)(3), and Section 8.01-380." 250 Va. 
at 33. "The grant of the non-suit did not deprive [Defendant] of any valid or vested 
-4-
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defense of the statute of limitations or of the time limits of Rule 3 :3. as we pointed 
out in Clark. The fact that the Clark Defendant may have had actual knowledge or 
. 
notice of the non-suit. while this Defendant did not. does not affect the force of the 
Clark precedent." 250 Va. at 34-35 (emphasis added). Again, Section 8.01-275.1 
merely codified Rule 3:3, and Clark v. Butler remains binding precedent, per the· 
recent opinions on point of the Court in McNamara and Gilbreath. 
2. DEFENDANTSHADACTUALCONTE~ORANEOUSKNOWLEDGE 
OF THE UNTOWARD INJURIOUS EVENTS AND 
CONCOMMITENTLY THE PROBABILITY FOR MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE SUIT, AND PLAINTIFF HAD GOOD REASON TO 
FEAR WORKPLACE RETALIATION FOR SERVING THE INITIAL 
SUIT. 
Defendants' own contemporaneous medical records for Plaintiff chronicle their 
actual knowledge that the epidural catheter was not placed properly and was leaking 
into her, and that the same had produced visible injury within the week. (See, e.g.,· 
Exhibit 7, 3/14/94 Nurse's Notes; and Exhibit 8, 3/14-22/94 Physician Progress~ 
Notes.) Indeed, in light of the foregoing, Ms. Friend of Risk Management at 
Riverside personally conferred with Plaintiff toward resolving the obvious 
malpractice claim; acknowledged awareness of the untoward and injurious events; 
requested all medical bill, lost wage, and other damage documentation; and assured 
that the same would be paid. (See, Exhibit 9, 1 0/28/99 Affidavit of Plaintiff at 3.) By 
fact that Plaintiff never concluded anything with Defendants, they were on notice of 
the continuing potential for litigation. 
As a 7-year full-time employee of Riverside, Plaintiffhad witnessed adverse 
personnel management. Accordingly, she feared that her livelihood would be 
jeopardized if she served her malpractice suit against Defendants during her tennure, 
notwithstanding its merits. (See, e.g., Exhibit 9, 10/28/99Affidavit ofPlaintiff at 4.) 
-5-
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WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays after rehearing the Court withdraw its letter 
opin\on dated October 5, 1999; reverse its ruling therein; and deny and overrule the 
various Pleas, Motions and/or other pleadings of supposed untimeliness and 
Defendants forthwith. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Avery T. Waterman, Jr., Esq. 
VSB No. 27118 
Patten, Womom, Hatten & Diamonstein, L.C. 
12350 Jefferson Ave., Suite 360 
Ne~ort News, Virginia 23602 
(757) 223-4555 
-6-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs 
Mot~op. for Reconsideration and Reljeaqng on 10/5/99 Letter Opmion (includin_g_9 
Exhibits) was sent by first class mall this -z9th da_y of October, 1999, to Gerald-R. 
Walsh, Esq._, Suite 200 4020 University Drive Fairfax VA 22030-6802, and to 
Carolyn P. Dast, Esq., Heilig, McKenry,t'raim & Lollar, P.C., 700 Newtown Road, 
Norfolk, VA 23502. 
-7- 000093 
I 
.. 
VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT C01.JRT FOR THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
LAURIEF.S. WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v . LawNo.: L97-1776 
SANDY BUTLER, :MICHELLE "ROE", 
JANINE :MOONEY, RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL, 
RIVERSIDE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
NAN COULEMAN, PAUL REIN, and 
J.M1ES RIVER ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, INC. 
MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF MOTION 
FOR J!JDGMENI AND MOTION TO DISMJSS 
COMES NOW the defendant, Janine Mooney, by counsel, and moves this Honorable Court 
for entry of an order quashing service of the Motion for Judgment and dismissing plaintiffs claims 
against her on the grounds that service was not timely made upon her. In support of this motion, the 
defendant states as follows:· 
1. Virginia Code Section 8.01-277 (1998 Cum. Supp.) allows. this defendant to file a 
Motion to :Quash Service either prior to or simultaneously with the filing of any pleading to the 
. 
merits and permits the Court to strike the proof of service upon sustaining such Motion. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment was filed on or about October 3, 1997. 
3. Defendant Janine Mooney was not served until October 8, 1998. 
4. Rule 3:3(c) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia states in pertinent part that 
''No judgment shall be entered against a defendant who was served with process more than one year 
after the commmencement of the action against him unless the court finds as a fact that the plaintiff 
exercised due diligence to have timely service on him." This rule is codified in Virginia Code 
Section 8.01-275.1 (1998 Cum. Supp.). 
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s.n. 480. Health insurance; calculation of cost sharing provisions, explanation of benefits. 
Amending §§ 38.2-514, 38.2-4214 and 38.2-4319; adding §§ 38.2-3407.2 ·and 
38.2-3407.3. 
Patrons: Holland, C.A., et al. 
Presented and ordered printed ...........•.......•................................. 200 
Referred to Committee on Commerce and Labor .................................•.... 201 
Reported ..................................................................... 4 I 0 
Constitutional reading dispensed, passed by for the day ........................•..... 424-5 
Read second time and engrossed ...................................•..•....•.. 448, 451 
Constitutional reading dispensed ..............................................•... 451 
Passed Senate ................•................................................ 452 
Passed House ............................•.....................•.............. 985 
Signed by President ........................................................... 1832 · 
Approved by Governor-C~apter 320 (effective 7/1194) 
S.B. 481. Divorce; suits for separate maintenance. Amending§§ 20-103, 20-107.1 and 20-109. 
Patrons: Calhoun, et aJ. 
Presented and ordered printed ....•................................................ 201 
Referred to Committee for Courts of Justice ......................................... 20 J 
Reported .......................•............................................. 457 
Constitutional reading dispensed, passed by for the day .......................... · .... 475-6 
Read second time and engrossed .....•......•.•...............•............... 492, 498 
Constitutional reading dispensed ....•..............•.......•.......•..........•... 498 
Passed Senate .•...................................•.................•......... 499 
Passed House ...................•.........•...............................•... 949 
Signed by President ................•...........•.............................. 1824 
Approved by Governor-Chapter 518 (effective 711/94) 
S.D. 482. Process; timely service. Adding§ 8.01-275.1. 
Patrons: .Trumbo, et al. 
Presented and ordered printed ........ ; ....•....• ; ......................•...•...... 201 
Referred to Committee for Courts of Justice ..................................•.•.... 201 
Reported ...........••.•.........................................•............ 345 
Constitutional reading dispensed, passed by for the day • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363-4 
Read second time and engrossed ....................•......................... 378, 382 
Constitutional reading dispensed .................................................. 383 
Passed Senate ........•.......•......•......................................... 384 
Statement by Mr. Hawkins on vote .........................•........•......•.•..... 384 
Passed House with amendment. ...................................•........•..... 1400 
House amendment agreed to .............•..................................... 1472-3 
Signed by President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1868 
Approved by Governor-Chapter 519 (effective 711/94) 
S.D. 483. Judges, substitute; employment of personnel. Amending § J 6.1-69.38. 
Patrons: Trumbo, et al. 
Presented and ordered printed ............•........••....•..•.............•........ 201 
Referred to Committee for Courts of Justice ..................................•...... 201 
S.D. 484. Employers; notice of possible safety and health violations. Amending§ 40. J-49.4. 
Patrons: Trumbo, et al. 
Presented and ordered printed ..................................................... 201 
Referred to Committee on Commerce and Labor ...................................... 201 
S.D. 485. Traffic schools; establishment. Amending § 46.2-1314 . 
. Patrons: Robb, et al. 
Presented and ordered printed .•...........•...........•..•.......•........•.....•. 201 
Referred to Committee on Transportation ...............•................•.•.....•.. 201 
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The recorded vote is as follows: 
YEAS--37. NAYS-0. RULE 36--0. 
YEAS-Andrews, Barry, Bell, Benedetti, Calhoun, Chichester. Colgan, Cross, Earley, Gartlan, 
Goode. Hawkins, Holland, C.A., Holland, E.M., Holland, R.J., Houck. Howell, Lambert, Marsh, Marye, 
Maxwell, Miller, K.G .• Miller, Y.B., Nolen, Norment, Potts, Quayle, Reasor, Robb, Saslaw, Schewe], 
Stolle, Stosch, Trumbo, WaddeD, Walker, Woods-37. 
NAYS-0. 
RULE36-0. 
The House joint resolutions, communicated as agreed to by the House of Delegates. were laid on the 
Clerk's Desk under Senate Rule 26 (g) as follows: 
HJ.R. 18, HJ.R. 21, H..J.R. 22, HJ.R. 23, HJ.R. 31, H..J.R. 32, HJ.R. 33, HJ.R. 34, H.J.R. 35, 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
HJ.R. 61, H.J.R. 62, HJ.R. 63, HJ.R. 64, and HJ.R. 65. 
(b): 
INTRODUCTION OF LEGISLATION 
The following. by leave, were presented, ordered to be printed, and referred under Senate Rule .)) 
S.B.201. A BilL to amend and reenact§ 2.1-342 of the Code of Virginia, relating to the Freedom of 
Information Act; exception for the Department of Alcohol Beverage Control. 
Patron-Holland, C.A. 
Referred to Committee on General Laws 
S.B. 202. A BILL to amend and reenact § 28.2-409 of the Code of Virginia, relating to menhaden 
fishing. · 
Patron-Holland, C.A. 
Referred to Committee on Agriculture, Conservation and Nabnal Resources 
S.B. 203. A BILL to amend and reenact§ 4.1-118 of the Code of Virginia, relating to release of 
certain information by the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control. 
Patron-Holland, C.A. 
Referred to Committee on Rehabilitation and Social Services 
S.B. 204. A BILL to amend and reenact§§ 38.2-135, 38.2-316. 38.2-400, 38.2-403, 38.2-1024, 
38.2-1303. 38.2-1800, 38.2-1819, 38.2-1822, 38.2-1833, 38.2-1834, 38.2-1840, 38.2-2223, 
38.2-2529, 38.2-3100, 38.2-3419.1, 38.2-3500, and 38.2-4802 of the Code of Virginia and to 
amend the Code of Virginia by adding in Article 3 of Chapter 35 of nile 38.2 a section 
numbered 38.2-3543.1, relating to insurance; State Corporation Commission; regulation and · 
administration. 
Patron-Holland, c.A. 
Referred to Committee on Commerce and Labor 
S.B. 205. A BILL to amend and reenact § 3.1-1060 of the Code of Virginia, relating to the 
Winegrowers Advisory Board. 
Patron-Robb 
Referred to Committee on Agriculmre, Conservation and Natural Resoiii'CCS 
00009'7 
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Delegates: Ball, Brickley, Connally, DeBoer, Forbes, Heilig, Melvin and Morgan 
Referred to Committee on Commerce and Labor 
's.B. 481. A BILL to amend and reenact§§ 20-103,20-107.1 and 20-109 of the Code of Virginia, 
relating to suits for separate maintenance. 
Patrons--Calhoun, . Barry, Gartlan, Holland, E.M. and Howell; Delegates: Brickley, Cohen, 
Copeland, Darner, Keating, Mayer, Mims and Puller 
Referred to Committee for Courts of Justice 
S.B. 482. A BILL to amend the Code of Virginia by adding in a section numbered 8.01-275.1, 
relating to service of process. 
Patrons--Trumbo, Marsh, Reasor and Stolle; Delegates: Armstrong, Baker, Bennett, Croshaw, 
Davies, Griffith, Johnson, Jones, J.C., McClure, Mims, Phillips and Putney 
Referred to Committee for Courts of Justice 
S.B. 483. A BILL to amend and reenact § 16.1-69.38 of the Code of Virginia, as it is currently 
effective and as it may become effective, relating to authorization for substitute judges and 
personnel. 
Patrons--Trumbo, Barry, Bell, Earley, Hawkins, Norment, Quayle and Stosch 
Referred to Committee for Courts of Justice 
S.B. 484. A BILL to amend and reenact § 40.1-49.4 of the Code of Virginia, relating to notice to 
employer of possible safety and health violations. 
Patrons--Trumbo, Bell, Earley, Hawkins, Norment, Quayle, Stosch, Wampler and Woods; Delegate: 
Putney 
Referred to Committee on Commerce and Labor 
S.D. 485. A BILL to amend and reenact § 46.2-1314 of the Code of Virginia, relating to traffic 
schools. 
Patrons--Robb and Bell 
Referred to Committee on Transportation 
S.B. 486. A BILL to amend and reenact§§ 2.1-639.2, 2.1-639.4, 2.1-639.14, 2.1-639.31, 2.1-639.33, 
and 24.2-502 of the Code of Virginia and to amend the Code of Virginia by adding in 1itle 2.1 a 
chapter numbered I 0.5, consisting of sections numbered 2.1-116.20 through 2.1-116.26, and in 
Article 2 of Chapter 40.1 a section numbered 2.1-639.4: I, relating to ethics and governmental 
accountability, conflicts of interests, and standards of conduct for state and local government 
offtcers and employees; penalties. 
Patrons--Gartlan, Andrews, Calhoun and Waddell; Delegates: Almand, Cranwell, Croshaw and 
Diamonstein 
Referred to Committee on General Laws 
S.D. 487. A BILL to amend and reenact§§ 24.2-901, 24.2-908,24.2-910,24.2-911, 24.2-912, 24.2-
916, 24.2-917, 24.2-919, 24.2-922, and 24.2-923 of the Code of Virginia and to amend the 
Code of Virginia by adding in Chapter 9 of 1itle 24.2 an article numbered 4.1, consisting of 
sections numbered 24.2-928.1 through 24.2-928.5, relating to campaign finance disclosure and 
contribution limits; and penalties. , . 
Patrons--Gartlan, Andrews, Calhoun and Waddell; Delegates: Croshaw and Diamonstein 
Referred to Committee on Privileges and Elections 
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S.J.R. 161 (one hundred sixty-one). 
S.J.R. 162 (one hundred sixty-two). 
SJ.R. 166 (one hundred sixty-six). 
SJ.R. 167 (one hundred sixty-seven). 
SJ.R. 169 (one hundred sixty-nine). 
SJ.R.l70 (one hundred seventy). 
The motion was agreed to. 
The recorded vote is as follows: 
YEAS--38. NAYS-0. RULE 36--0. 
-344- JOURNAL OF THE SENA1T 
YEAS--Andrews, Barry, Bell, Benedetti, Oilhoun, Chichester: Colgan, Cross, Earley, Gartlan, 
Goode, Hawkins, Holland, C.A., Holland, E.M., Holland, RJ., Houck, Howell, Lambert, Lucas, Marsh, 
Marye, Maxwell, Miller, K.G., Miller, Y.B., Nolen, Norment, Potts, Quayle, Reasor, Robb, Saslaw, 
Stolle, Stosch, Trumbo, Waddell, Walker, Wampler, Woods--38. 
NAYS-0. 
RULE36--0. 
On motion of Mr. Andrews, the following Senate joint resolutions were passed by for the day: 
SJ.R. 161 (one hundred sixty-one). 
S.J.R.162 (one hundred sixty-two). 
SJ.R. 166 (one hundred sixty-six). 
S.J.R. 167 (one hundred sixty-seven). 
SJ.R. 169 (one hundred sixty-nine). 
S.J.R. 170 (one hundred seventy). 
INTRODUCTION OF LEGISLATION 
Pursuant to the provisions of House Joint Resolution No. 2 and Senate Rule II (b), Mr. Gartlan 
requested unanimous consent to introduce a bill. 
The Senate refused to give its unanimous consent. 
· On motion of Mr. Marye, a leave of absence for the day was granted Mr. Schewe!. 
On motion of Mr. Walker, the Senate adjourned until tomorrow at 12m. Pursuant to Rule 21 (d)ii, 
the Clerk was ordered to receive the committee reports. 
COMMITI'EE REPORTS 
The following bills, having beeri considered by the committee in session, were reported by Mr. 
Holland, E.M., from the Committee for Courts of Justice: 
S.D. 60 (sixty). 
S.D. 61 (sixty-one) with amendments. 
S.D. 73 (seventy-three). 
S.D.l31 (one hundred thirty-one). 
S.D.167 (one hundred sixty-seven) with amendment. 
S.D.187 (one hundred eighty-seven) with the recommendation that it be rereferred to the Committee 
on Finance. 
S.D.189 (one hundred eighty-nine) with amendments. 
S.D.l93 (one hundred ninety-three). 
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S.D. 194 (one hundred ninety-four). 
S.B. 199 (one hundred ninety-nine) with amendments. 
S.B. 206 (two hundred six). 
S.D. 219 (two hundred nineteen) with amendment with the recommendation that it be rereferred to 
the ~ommittee on Education and Health. 
S.D. 272 (two hundred seventy-two) with substitute. 
S.D. 287 (two hundred eighty-seven). 
S.D. 420 (four hundred twenty). 
S.D. 482 (four hundred eighty-two). 
S.B. 526 (five hundred twenty-six). 
S.B. 538 (five hundred thirty-eight) with amendment. 
S.B. 539 (five hundred thirty-nine) with amendment with the recommendation that it be rereferred to 
the Committee on Finance. 
The following bills, having been considered by the committee in session, were reported by Mr. 
Marye from the Committee on General Laws: 
S.B. 1 (one) with substitute with amendment. 
S.B. 122 (one hundred twenty-two) with substitute with the recommendation that it be rereferred to 
the Committee on Finance. 
S.B. 125 (one hundred twenty-five) with substitute with amendment. 
S.B. 129 (one hundred twenty-nine) with amendment. 
S.B. 172 (one hundred seventy-two) with amendment. 
S.B. 231 (two hundred thirty-one) with amendments. 
S.B. 232 (two hundred thirty-two). 
S.D. 251 (two hundred fifty-one). 
S.D. 260 (two hundred sixty). 
S.D. 269 (two hundred sixty-nine) with the recommendation that it be rereferred to the Committee 
on Finance. 
S.B. 277 (two hundred seventy-seven). 
S.D. 312 (three hundred twelve). 
S.D. 320 (three hundred twenty). 
S.B. 342 (three hundred forty-two). 
S.D. 343 (three hundred forty-three). 
S.D. 350 (three hundred fifty). 
S.D. 383 (three hundred eighty-three). 
S.D. 405 (four hundred five) with amendments. 
S.D. 422 (four hundred twenty-two). 
S.D. 442 (four hundred forty-two). 
S.D. 448 (four hundred forty-eight) with amendment. 
S.D. 457 (four hundred fifty-seven) with amendments with the recommendation that it be rereferred 
to the Committee on Finance. 
S.B. 504 (five hundred four) with the recommendation that it be rereferred to the Committee on 
Finance. 
S.D. 558 (five hundred fifty-eight) with substitute with amendments with the recommendation that it 
be rereferred to the Committee on Finance. 
S.D. 565 (five hundred sixty-fl~e). 
S.D. 585 (five hundred eighty-five). 
S.D. 586 (five hundred eighty-six). 
S.D. 588 (five hundred eighty-eight). 
S.B. 591 (five hundred ninety-one) with the recommendation that it be rereferred to the Committee 
on Finance. 
S.D. 602 (six hundred two) with the recommendation that it be rereferred to the Committee on 
Finance. 
S.D. 122, S.D. 187, S.D. 269, S.B. 457, S.D. 504, S.B. 539, S.D. 558, S.B. 591, and S.B. 602 were 
rereferred to the Committee on Finance. 
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On motion of Mr. Andrews, the following Senate bills were ordered en bloc to be engrossed and read 
by title the third time: 
• S.D. 111 (one hundred eleven) as amended. 
S.D. 159 (one hundred fifty-nine). 
S.D. 223 (two hundred twenty-three) as amended. 
S.B. 489 (four hundred eighty-nine). 
S.B. 567 (five hundred sixty-seven). 
SENATE BILLS ON FIRST READING 
Mr. Andrews moved that the Rules be suspended and the first reading of the titles of the following 
Senate bills, as required by Article IV, Section II, of the Constitution, be dispensed with: 
S.B. 1 (one). 
S.B. 60 (sixty). 
S.B. 61 (sixty-one). 
S.B. 73 (seventy-three). 
S.B.129 (one hundred twenty-nine). 
S.B. 131 (one hundred thirty-one). 
S.B. 167 (one hundred sixty-seven). 
S.B. 170 (one hundred seventy). 
S.B.172 (one hundred seventy-two). 
S.B.189 (one hundred eighty-nine). 
S.B. 193 (one hundred ninety-three). 
S.B. 194 (one hundred ninety-four). 
S.B. 199 (one hundred ninety-nine). 
S.B. 206 (two hundred six). 
S.B. 232 (two hundred thirty-two). 
S.B. 272 (two hundred seventy-two). 
S.B. 278 (two hundred seventy-eight). 
S.B. 287 (two hundred eighty-seven). 
S.B. 312 (three hundred twelve). 
S.B. 320 (three hundred twenty). 
S.B. 342 (three hundred forty-two). 
S.B. 343 (three hundred forty-three). 
S.B. 383 (three hundred eighty-three). 
S.B. 405 (four hundred five). 
S.B. 420 (four hundred twenty). 
S.B. 422 (four hundred twenty-two). 
S.B. 442 (four hundred forty-two). 
S.B. 448 (four hundred forty-eight). 
S.B. 482 (four hundred eighty-two). 
S.B. 493 (four hundred ninety-three). 
S.B. 526 (five hundred twenty-six). 
S.B. 565 (five hundred sixty-five). 
S.B. 125 (one hundred twenty-five). 
S.B. 148.(one hundred forty-eight). 
S.B. 231 (two hundred thirty-one). 
S.B. 251 (two hundred fifty-one). 
S.B. 260 (two hundred sixty). 
S.B. 277 (two hundred seventy-seven). 
S.B. 350 (three. hundred fifty). 
S.B. 426 (four hundred twenty-six). 
S.B. 538 (five hundred thirty-eight). 
S.B. 585 (five hundred eighty-five). 
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S.B. 586 (five hundred eighty-six). 
S.B. 588 (five hundred eighty-eight). 
The motion was agreed to. 
The recorded vote is as follows: 
YEAS--35. NAYS--0. RULE 36--0. 
-31>4- .1 ~NAL OF THE SENATE 
YEAS--Andrews, Barry, Bell, Benedetti, Calhoun, Chichester, Colgan, Cross, Earley, Gartlan, 
Goode, Hawkins, Holland, E.M., Houck, Howell, Lambert, Marsh, Marye, Maxwell, Miller, K.G., Miller, 
Y.B., Norment, Potts, Quayle, Reasor, Robb, Saslaw, Schewe), Stolle, Stosch, Trumbo, Waddell, Walker, 
Wampler, Woods--35. 
NAYS--0. 
RULE36--0. 
On motion of Mr. Andrews, the following Senate bills were passed by for the day: 
S.B. 1 (one). 
S.B. 60 (sixty). 
S.B. 61 (sixty-one). 
S.B. 73 (seventy-three). 
S.B. 129 (one hundred twenty-nine). 
S.B. 131 (one hundred thirty-one). 
S.B. 167 (one hundred sixty-seven). 
S.B.170 (one hundred seventy). 
S.B. 172 (one hundred seventy-two). 
S.B. 189 (one hundred eighty-nine). 
S.B.193 (one hundred ninety-three). 
S.B. 194 (one hundred ninety-four). 
S.B. 199 (one hundred ninety-nine). 
S.B. 206 (two hundred six). 
S.B. 232 (two hundred thirty-two). 
S.B. 272 (two hundred seventy-two). 
S.B. 278 (two hundred seventy-eight). 
S.B. 287 (two hundred eighty-seven). 
S.B. 312 (three hundred twelve). 
S.B. 320 (three hundred twenty). 
S.B. 342 (three hundred forty-two). 
S.B. 343 (three hundred forty-three). 
S.B. 383 (three hundred eighty-three). 
S.B. 405 (four hundred five). 
S.B. 420 (four hundred twenty). 
S.B. 422 (four hundred twenty-two). 
S.B. 442 (four hundred forty-two). 
S.B. 448 (four hundred forty-eight). 
S.B. 482 (four hundred eighty-two). 
S.B. 493 (four hundred ninety-three). 
S.B. 526 (five hundred twenty-six). 
S.B. 565 (five hundred sixty-five). 
S.B. 125 (one hundred twenty-five). 
S.B. 148 (one hundred forty-eight). 
S.B. 231 (two hundred thirty-one). 
S.B. 251 (two hundred fifty-one). 
S.B. 260 (two hundred sixty). 
S.B. 277 (two hundred seventy-seven). 
S.B. 350 (three hundred fifty). 
000102 
Jl)lJRNA L OF TilE 'ATL -377- ·Jny, Fehrn:~ry a, B>!J<: 
The recorded vote is as follows: 
YEAS--36. NA YS--2. RULE 36--0. 
YEAS--Andrews, Barry, Bell, Calhoun, ·Chichester, Colgan, Cross, Earley, Gartlan, Goode, 
Hawkins, Holland, C.A., Holland, E.M., Holland, R.J., Houck, Howell, Lambert, Marsh, Marye, 
Maxwell, Miller, K.G., Miller, Y.B., Nolen, Norment, Potts, Quayle, Reasor, Robb, Saslaw, Schewe!, 
Stolle, Stosch, Trumbo, Walker, Wampler, Woods--36. 
NAYS--Benedetti, Waddell-2. 
RULE 36--0. 
S.D. 489 (four hundred eighty-nine) was read by title the third time and, on motion of Mr. Gartlan, 
was passed with its title. 
The recorded vote is as follows: 
YEAS--38. NAYS--0. RULE 36--0. 
YEAS--Andrews, Barry, Bell, Benedetti, Calhoun, Chichester, Colgan, Cross, Earley, Gartlan, 
Goode, Hawkins, Holland, C. A., Holland, E.M., Holland, R.J., Houck, Howell, Lambert, Marsh, Marye, 
Maxwell, Miller, K.G., Miller, Y.B., Nolen, Norment, Potts, Quayle, Reasor, Robb, Saslaw, Schewe), 
Stolle, Stosch, Trumbo, Waddell, Walker, Wampler, Woods--38. 
NAYS--0. . 
RULE 36--0. 
S.D. 567 (five hundred sixty-seven) was read by title the third time and, on motion of Mr. Saslaw, 
was passed with its title. 
The recorded vote is as follows: 
YEAS--37. NAYS--0. RULE 36--0. 
YEAS--Andrews, Barry, Bell, Benedetti, Chichester, Colgan, Cross, Earley, Gartlan, Goode, 
Hawkins, Holland, C.A., Holland, E.M., Holland, R.J., Houck, Howell, Lambert, Marsh, Marye, 
Maxwell, Miller, K.G., Miller, Y.B., Nolen, Norment, Potts, Quayle, Reasor, Robb, Saslaw, Schewe!, 
Stolle, Stosch, Trumbo, Waddell, Walker, Wampler, Woods--37. 
NAYS--0. 
RULE 36--0. 
SENATE DILLS ON SECOND READING 
S.B. 172 (one hundred seventy-two), on motion of Mr. Holland, E.M., was passed by for the day. 
S.B. 442 (four hundred forty-two), on motion of Mr. Quayle, was passed by for the day. 
Mr. Andrews moved that the engrossment of the Senate bills that follow be considered en- bloc. 
The motion was agreed to. 
The following Senate bills were read by title the second time: 
S.D. 158 (one hundred fifty-eight). 
S.B. 60 (sixty). 
S.B. 73 (seventy-three). 
8.8.131 (one hundred thirty-one). 
S.B. 193 (one hundred ninety-three). 
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S.B. 194 (one hundred ninety-four). 
S.B. 206 (two hundred six). 
S.B. 232 (two hundred thirty-two). 
S.B. 278 (two hundred seventy-eight). 
S.D. 287 (two hundred eighty-seven). 
S.D. 312 (three hundred twelve). 
S.D. 320 (three hundred twenty). 
S.D. 342 (three hundred forty-two). 
S.D. 343 (three hundred forty-three). 
S.D. 383 (three hundred eighty-three). 
S.D. 420 (four hundred twenty). 
S.D. 422 (four hundred twenty-two). 
S.D. 482 (four hundred eighty-two). 
S.D. 526 (five hundred twenty-six). 
S.D. 565 (five hundred sixty-live). 
-371>-
S.D. 1 (one) was read by title the second time. 
Jl NAL OF THE SENATE 
The amendment in the nature of a substitute proposed by the Committee on General Laws was 
offered, having been printed separately, with its title reading as follows: 
A BILL to amend and reenact § 9-77.8 of the Code of Virginia, relating to the Code Commission's 
authority when contracting with a publisher; closed meetings. 
The reading of the substitute was waived. 
On motion of Mr. Gartlan, the substitute was agreed to. 
The following committee amendment to the substitute was offered: 
I. Page I, substitute, line 29, after proposals 
insert 
which contain trade secrets or proprietary itiformation 
The reading of the amendment was waived. 
On motion of Mr. Gartlan, the amendment was agreed to. 
S.D. 61 (sixty-one) was read by title the second time. 
The following amendments proposed by the Committee for Courts of Justice were offered: 
I. Page I, introduced, line 51, after cause 
insert 
(i) 
2. Page I, introduced, line 53, afterlonger 
insert 
and(ii) any affidavits for search warrants and search warrants, provided at least 
three years have passed since issued, 
3. Page 2, introduced, line I, after retention, 
0001.04 
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The reading of the amendment was waived. 
On motion of Mr. Stolle, the amendment was agreed to. 
S.D. 493 (four hundred ninety-three) was read by title the second time. 
Mr. Goode offered the following amendment: 
I. Page 1, introduced, after end of line 22 
insert 
No Treasurer of any county or city may be required to accept credit cards or 
debit cards for such purposes without his consent. 
On motion of Mr. Goode, the reading of the amendment was waived. 
On motion of Mr. GOode, the amendment was agreed to. 
On motion of Mr. Andrews, the following Senate bills were ordered en bloc to be engrossed and read 
by title the third time: 
S.D. 158 (one hundred fifty-eight). 
S.D. 1 (one) as amended. 
S.D. 60 (sixty). 
S.D. 61 (sixty-one) as amended. 
S.D. 73 (seventy-three). 
S.D. 129 (one hundred twenty-nine) as amended. 
S.D.131 (one hundred thirty-one). 
S.D.167 (one hundred sixty-seven) as amended. 
S.D.170 (one hundred seventy) as amended. 
S.D.189 (one hundred eighty-nine) as amended. 
S.D. 193 (one hundred ninety-three). 
S.B. 194 (one hundred ninety-four). 
S.D.199 (one hundred ninety-nine) as amended. 
S.D. 206 (two hundred six). 
S.D. 232 (two hundred thirty-two). 
S.D. 272 (two hundred seventy-two) as amended. 
S.D. 278 (two hundred seventy-eight). 
S.D. 287 (two hundred eighty-seven). 
S.D. 312 (three hundred twelve). 
S.D. 320 (three hundred twenty). 
S.D. 342 (three hundred forty-two). 
S.D. 343 (three hundred forty-three). 
S.D. 383 (three hundred eighty-three). 
S.D. 405 (four hundred five) as amended. 
S.D. 420 (four hundred twenty). 
S.D. 422 (four hundred twenty-two). 
S.D. 448 (four hundred forty-eight) as amended. 
S.D. 482 (four hundred eighty-two). 
S.D. 493 (four hundred ninety-three) as amended. 
S.D. 526 (five hundred twenty-six). 
S.D. 565 (five hundred sixty-five). 
Mr. Andrews moved that the Rules be suspended and the third reading of the titles of the following 
Senate bills, as required by Article IV, Section 11, of the Constitution, be dispensed with: 
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S.D. 158 (one hundred fifty-eight). 
S.D. 1 (one). 
S.B. 60 (sixty). 
S.B. 61 (sixty-one). 
S.B.•73 (seventy-three). 
S.B. 129 (one hundred twenty-nine). 
S.B. 131 (one hundred thirty-one). 
S.B.167 (one hundred sixty-seven). 
S.B. 170 (one hundred seventy). 
S.D. 189 (one hundred eighty-nine). 
S.B. 193 (one hundred ninety-three). 
S.B.194 (one hundred ninety-four). 
S.B.199 (one hundred ninety-nine) . 
Fri February 4, l9tJ4 
· ·····-·· ····-· -----s.B;206"(twobundred·six):-----·-----·-- --- ···-···· -·---···-·····------·····- •· ---··-·--··-- ··-·--··-·-·-···· -·· ·- ····· ·-··-- ·-·· -··--······ -- ·· . 
S.B. 232 (two hundred thirty-two). 
S.D. 272 (two hundred seventy-two). 
S.B. 278 (two hundred seventy-eight). 
S.B. 287 (two hundred eighty-seven). 
S.B. 312 (three hundred twelve). 
S.B. 320 (three hundred twenty). 
S.B. 342 (three hundred forty-two). 
S.B. 343 (three hundred forty-three). 
S.B. 383 (three hundred eighty-three). 
S.D. 405 (four hundred five). 
S.B. 420 (four hundred twenty). 
S.B. 422 (four hundred twenty-two). 
S.B. 448 (four hundred forty-eight). 
s.n. 482 (four hundred eighty-two). 
S.B. 493 (four hundred ninety-three). 
S.B. 526 (five hundred twenty-six). 
S.D. 565 (five hundred sixty-five). 
The motion was agreed to. 
The recorded vote is as follows: 
YEAS-38. NAYS-0. RULE 36-0. 
YEAS--Andrews, Barry, Bell, Benedetti, Calhoun, Chichester, Colgan, Cross, Earley, Gartlan, 
Goode, Hawkins, Holland, C.A., Holland, E.M., Holland, R.J., Houck, Howell, Lambert, Marsh, Marye, 
Maxwell, Miner, K.G., Miller, Y.B., Nolen, Norment, Potts, Quayle, Reasor, Robb, Saslaw, Schewe), 
Stolle, Stosch, Trumbo, Waddell, Walker, Wampler, Woods--38. 
NAYS-0. 
RULE36--0. 
S.B. 61 (sixty-one), on motion of Mr. Goode, was passed by for the day. 
S.R. 272 (two hundred seventy-two), on motion of Mr. Goode, was passed by for the day. 
Mr. An~s moved that the passage of the Senate bills that follow be considered en bloc. 
The motion was agreed to. 
On motion of Mr. Andrews, the following Senate bills were passed en bloc with their tides: 
S.R. 158 (one hundred fifty-eight). 
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s.n. 1 (one). 
S.D. 60 (sixty). 
S.D. 73 (seventy-three). 
, S.D. 131 (one hundred thirty-one). 
S.D. 167 (one hundred sixty-seven). 
S.D. 170 (one hundred seventy). 
S.D. 189 (one hundred eighty-nine) .. 
S.D. 193 (one hundred ninety-three). 
S.D. 194 (one hundred ninety-four). 
S.D. 199 (one hundred ninety-nine). 
S.D. 206 (two hundred six). 
S.D. 232 (two hundred thirty-two). 
s.n. 278 (two hundred seventy-eight). 
S.D. 287 (two hundred eighty-seve!)). 
S.D. 312 (three hundred twelve). 
S.D. 320 (three hundred twenty). 
S.D. 342 (three hundred forty-two). 
S.D. 343 (three hundred forty-three). 
S.D. 383 (three hundred eighty-three). 
S.D. 405 (four hundred five). 
S.D. 420 (four hundred twenty). 
S.D. 422 (four hundred twenty-two). 
S.D. 448 (four hundred forty-eight). 
S.D. 482 (four hundred eighty-two). 
S.D. 493 (four hundred ninety-three). 
S.D. 526 (five hundred twenty-six). 
S.D. 565 (five hundred sixty-five). 
The recorded vote is as follows: 
YEAS--37. NAYS--0. RULE 36-·0. 
-31\4- .10 ~AL OF THE SENATE 
YEAS--Andrews, Barry, Bell, Benedetti, Calhoun, Chichester, Colgan, Cross, Earley, Gartlan, 
Goode, Holland, C.A., Holland, E.M., Holland, R.l, Houck, Howell, Lambert, Marsh, Marye, Maxwell, 
Miller, K.G., Miller, Y.B., Nolen, Norment, Potts, Quayle, Reasor, Robb, Saslaw, Schewe!, Stolle, Stosch, 
Trumbo, Waddell, Walker, Wampler, Woods--37. 
NAYS--0. 
RULE36--0. 
STATEMENT ON VOTE 
Mr. Hawkins stated that he was recorded as not voting on the question of the passage of S.D. 158, 
S.D. 1, S.D. 60, S.D. 73, S.D. 131, S.D. 167, S.D. 170, S.D. 189, S.B. 193, S.B. 194, S.D. 199, S.D. 206, 
S.D. 232, S.B. 278, S.B. 287, S.B. 312, S.B. 320, S.B. 342, S.B. 343, S.B. 383, S.B. 405, S.B. 420, S.B. 
422, S.B. 448, S.D. 482, S.B. 493, S.D. 526, and S.B. 565, whereas he intended to vote yea. 
S.D. 129, (one hundred twenty-riine) on motion of Mr. Walker, was passed with its title. 
The recorded vote is as follows: 
YEAS--34. NAYS--0. RULE 36--4. 
YEAS--Andrews, Barry, Bell, Benedetti, Calhoun, Chichester, Colgan, Cross, Gartlan, Goode, 
Hawkins, Holland, RJ., Houck, Howell, Lambert, Marsh, Marye, Maxwell, Miller, Y.B., Nolen, 
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the Code of Virginia and to amend the Code of Virginia by adding in Article 3 of Chapter 3 a 
section numbered 58.1-339.2, relating to income tax credits and sales and use tax exemptions. 
IN WHICH ACTION IT REQUESTS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE. 
lsi Bruce F.Jamerson 
Clerk, House of Delegates 
In the House of Delegates 
Man:h 8, 1994 
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATFS HAS PASSED WITH AMENDMENTS THE FOLLOWING 
SENATE BILLS: 
S.B. 61. A BILL to amend and reenact § 17-47.4 of the Code of Virginia, relating to disposition of 
papers in ended cases. 
S.R. 62. A BILL to amend and reenact§ 19.2-165 of the Code of Virginia, relating to felony cases; 
recording evidence. 
S.R. 67. A BILL to amend and reenact§ 16.1-309.1 of the Code of Virginia, relating to exceptions to 
confidentiality of certain information on juveniles. 
S.D. 180. A BILL to amend and reenact §§ 18.2-51.1 and 18.2-57 .I of the Code of Virginia, relating 
to malicious injury and assault and battery of police officers. 
S.D. 351. A BILL to amend and reenact§ 15.1-2924 of the Code of Virginia, relating to regulation 
of itonnwater. 
S.D. 482. A BILL to amend the Code of Virginia by adding in a section numbered 8.01-275.1, 
relating to service of process. 
S.D. 515. A BILL to amend and reenact § 221-201 of the Code of Virginia, relating to study of 
documents of Virginia history. 
S.D. 520. A BILL to amend and reenact§§ 16.1-228 and 16.1-241, as they are currently effective 
and as they may become effective; §16.1-249; II 16.1-270, 16.1-271, 16.1-275, 16.1-278.8, 
and 16.1-280, as they are currently effective and as they may become effective;§ 16.1-285.1; § 
16.1-299, as it is currently effective and as it may become effective;§ 16.1-301; § 16.1-306 as 
it is currently effective and as it may become effective; § 18.2-308.2; § 19.2-240, as it is 
currently effective and as it may become effective; and§§ 19.2-311 and 53.1-20 of the Code of 
Virginia; to amend the Code of Virginia by adding in Article 7 of Chapter Jl of ntJe J6.J 
sections numbered 16.1-269.1 through 16.1-269.6, twice, as they will become effective on July 
I, 1994, and as they may become effective, and by adding sections numbered 16.1-285.2 and 
66-25.2; and to. repeal§ 16.1-269 of the Code of Virginia, as it is currently effective and as it 
may become effective, relating to serious juvenile offenders; penalties. · 
S.B. 570. A BILL to amend and reenact § S 1.1-808 of the Code of Virginia, relating to the powers, 
authority, and duties of police officers' pension and retirement boards. 
S.D. 580. A BILL to amend the Code of Virginia by adding a section numbered 64.1-147.1, relating 
to exercise of power of sale. 
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On motion of Mr. Robb, the joint conference committee report was agreed to. 
• The recorded vote is as follows: 
YEAS--40. NAYS-0. RULE 36--0. 
YEAS--Andrews, Barry, Bell, Benedetti, Calhoun, Chichester, Colgan, Cross, Earley, Gartlan, 
Goode, Hawldns, Holland, C.A., Holland, E.M., Holland, R.J., Houck, Howell, Lambert, Lucas, Marsh, 
Martin, Marye, Maxwell, Miller, K.G., Miller, Y.B., Nolen, Norment, Potts, Quayle, Reasor, Robb, 
Saslaw, Schewe), Stolle, Stosch, Trumbo, Waddell, Walker, Wampler, Woods-40. 
NAYS--0. 
RULE36--0. 
CONFERENCE PROCEDURES 
H.B. 422 (four hundred twenty-two) was taken up. 
Mr. Gartlan moved that the Senate insist on its substitute and respectfully request a committee of 
conference. 
The motion was agreed to. 
The recorded vote is as follows: 
YEAS--39. NAYS-0. RULE 36--0. 
YEAS--Andrews, Barry, Bell, Benedetti, Calhoun, Chichester, Colgan, Cross, Earley, Gartlan, 
Goode, Hawkins, Holland, C.A., Holland, E.M., Holland, R.J., Howell, Lambert, Lucas, Marsh, Marlin, 
Marye, MaxweU, Miller, K.G., Miller, Y.B., Nolen, Norment, Potts, Quayle, Reasor, Robb, Saslaw, 
Schewe), Stolle, Stosch, Trumbo, Waddell, Walker, Wampler, Woods-39. 
NAYS--0. 
RULE36--0. 
SENATE BILLS WITH HOUSE AMENDMENTS 
S.D. 61 (sixty-one) was taken up with the amendments proposed by the House of Delegates as 
follows: 
I. Page I, engrossed, line 54, after for 
insert 
unexecuted 
2. Page 2, engrossed, line I, after and 
insert 
unexecuted 
On motion of Mr. Quayle, the amendments were agreed to. 
The recorded vote is as follows: 
YEAS--38. NAYS--0. RULE 36-0. 
YEAS--Andrews, Barry, Bell, Benedetti, Calhoun, Chichester, Colgan, Cross, Earley, Gartlan, 
Goode, Hawkins, Holland, C.A., Holland, R.J., Houck, Howell, Lambert, Lucas, Marsh, Martin, 
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S.B. 287 (two hundred eighty-seven) was taken up with the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
proposed by the House of Delegates, and printed separately, the title reading as follows: 
A BILL to amend and reenact U 8.01-576.9, 8.01-576.10 and 8.01-576.11 of the Code of Virginia, 
relating to dispute resolution; child support. 
On motion of Mrs. Howel~ the substitute was agreed to. 
The recorded vote is as follows: 
YEAS--39. NAYS-0. RULE 36--0. 
YEAS--Andrews, Barry, Bell, Benedetti, Calhoun, Chichester, Colgan, Cross, Earley, Gartlan, 
Goode, Hawkins, Holland, C.A., Holland, RJ., Houck, Howell, Lambert, Lucas, Marsh, Martin, Marye, 
Maxwell, Miller, K.G., Miller, Y.B., Nolen, Norment, Potts, Quayle, Reasor, Robb, Saslaw, Schewel, 
Stolle, Stosch, Trumbo, WaddeD, Walker, Wampler, Woods--39. 
NAYS--0. 
RULE36--0. 
S.B. 351 (three hundred fifty-one) was taken up with the amendments proposed by the House of 
Delegates as follows: 
1. Page 1, engrossed, line 31, after owners 
insert 
or lentmts (when the tenant, or tenants, Is the party to whom the water and 
sewer service l.r billed) 
2. Page 2, engrossed . 
strike 
all ortine 2 
On motion of Mr. Maxwell, the amendments were agreed to. 
The recorded vote is as follows: 
YEAS--39. NAYS-0. RULE 36--0. 
YEAS--Andrews, Barry, Bell, Benedetti, Calhoun, Chichester, Colgan, Cross, Earley, Gartlan, 
Goode, Hawkins, Holland, C.A., Holland, E.M., Holland, RJ., Houck, Howell, Lambert, Lucas, Marsh, 
Martin, Maxwell, Miner, K:G., Miller, Y.B., Nolen, Norment, Potts, Quayle, Reasor, Robb, Saslaw, 
Schewel, Stolle, Stosch, Trumbo, WaddeD, Walker, Wampler, Woods-39. 
NAYS-0. 
RULE36--0. 
S.B. 482 (four hundred eighty-two) was taken up with the amendment proposed by the House of 
DelegalcS as follows: 
I. Page 1, engrossed, line 16, after Service 
insert 
of 
On motion of Mr. Trumbo, the amendment was agreed to. 
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The recorded vote is as follows: 
YEAS--40. NAYS--0. RULE 36-0. 
YEAS--Andrews,· Barry, Bell, Benedetti, Calhoun, Chichester, Colgan, Cross, Earley, Gartlan, 
Goode, Hawkins, Holland, C.A., Holland, E.M., Holland, RJ., Houck, Howell, Lambert, Lucas, Marsh, 
Martin, Marye, Maxwell, Miller, K.G., Miller, Y.B., Nolen, Norment, Potts, Quayle, Reasor, Robb, 
Slislaw, Schewe), Stolle, Stosch, Trumbo, WaddeD, Walker, Wampler, Woods--40. 
NAYS-0. 
RULE36-0. 
S.B. 492 (four hundred ninety-two) was taken up with the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
proposed by the House of Delegates, and printed separately, the title reading as follows: 
A BILL to amend and reenact § SS-19.S of the Code of Virginia, relating to certain inter vivos trust 
exemptions relating to Medicaid assets. 
On motion of Mr. Quayle, the substitute was agreed to. 
The recorded vote is as follows: 
YBAS--40. NAYS-0. RULE 36-0. 
YEAS-Andrews, Barry, Bell, Benedetti, Calhoun, Chichester, Colgan, Cross, Earley, Gartlan, 
Goode, Hawkins, Holland, C.A., Holland, E.M., Holland, RJ., Houck, Howell, Lambert, Lucas, Marsh, 
Martin, Marye, MaxweD, Miller, K.O., MOler, Y.B., Nolen, Norment, Potts, Quayle, Reasor, Robb, 
Saslaw, Schewe!, Stolle, Stosch, Trumbo, WaddeD, Walker, Wampler, Woods--40. 
NAYS-0. 
RULE3~-0. 
S.B. 515 (five hundred fifteen) was taken up with the amendment proposed by the House of 
Delegates as follows: 
I. Page I, engrossed, line 21 
insert 
2. That the provisions ohhls act shaD expire on July I, 1995. 
On motion of Mr. Earley, the amendment was agreed to. 
The recorded vote is as follows: 
YEAS--40. NAYS-0. RULE 36-0. 
YEAS--Andrews, Barry, Bell, Benedetti, Calhoun, .Chichester, Colgan, Cross, Earley, Gartlan, 
Goode, Hawkins, Holland, C.A., Holland, E.M., HoiJand, RJ., Houck, Howell, Lambert, Lucas, Marsh, 
Martin, Marye, Maxwell, Miller, K.G., Miller, Y.B., Nolen, Norment, Potts, Quayle, Reasor, Robb, 
Saslaw, Schewel, Stolle, Stosch, Trumbo, WaddeD, Walker, Wampler, Woods--40. 
NAYS-0. 
RULE36-o. 
S.B. 516 (five hundred sixteen) was taken up with the amendment in the nature of a substimte 
proposed by the House of Delegates, and printed separately, the tide reading as follows: 
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I thank the members for their hard work and diligence, and wish them well. 
Sincerely, 
/s/ George Allen 
Mr. Walker moved that the Senate adjourn sine die. 
The motion was agreed to. 
The President declared the Senate adjourned sine die. 
LEGISLATION SIGNED BY THE PRESIDING OFFICER 
SUBSEQUENT TO ADJOURNMENT SINE DIE 
Subsequent to adjournment sine die of the I 994. Regular Session, the President of the Senate, as 
required by Article IV, Section 1 I, of the Constitution, on the dates recorded below, signed the following 
bills that had been passed by both houses and duly enrolled: 
March 14, 1994 
H.B. 128. An Act for the relief of Bradley A. Trussell. 
H.B.160. An Act to amend and reenact§ 6.05, as amended, of Chapter 717 of the Acts of Assembly 
of 1980, which provided a charter for the City of Chesapeake, relating to bonds. 
H.B.171. An Act to amend and reenact§ 18.2-128 of the Code of Virginia, relating to trespass upon 
church or school property. 
H.B. 203. An Act to authorize the issuance of bonds subject to the provisions of Section 9 (c) of 
Article X of the Constitution of Virginia in an amount not to exceed $166,494,300, plus 
amounts needed to fund issuance costs, reserve funds and other financing expenses, for the 
purpose of providing funds with any other available funds for paying the costs of acquiring, 
constructing and equipping revenue-producing capital projects at institutions of higher learning 
of the Commonwealth; to authorize the Treasury Board, by and with the consent of the 
Governor, to fix the details of such bonds and to provide for the sale of such bonds at public or 
private sale; to provide for the pledge of the net revenues of such capital projects and the full 
faith, credit and taxing power of the Commonwealth for the payment of the principa] of and the 
interest on such bonds; to provide that such bonds shall be exempt from aD taxation by the 
Commonwealth and any political subdivision thereof; and to repeal Chapters 507 and SIS of 
the Acts of Assembly of 1993. 
H.B. 209. An Act to amend and reenact§ 18.2-308 of the Code of Virginia, relating to concealed 
weapons permits. 
H.B. 215. An Act to amend and reenact§ 58.1-2101 of the Code of Virginia, relating to motor fuel 
and special fuel tax definitions. 
H.B. 226. An Act to amend and reenact§ 18.2-268.4 of the Code of Virginia, relating to sanctions 
for refusal to take a blood or breath test; penalty. 
H.B. 242. An Act to amend and reenact § 15.1-26.2 of the Code of Virginia, relating to expenditure 
of county general revenues for certain roads. 
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funds which may be appropriated by the General Assembly; and further providing that the 
interest income from such bonds shalt be exempt from all taxation within the Commonwealth; 
and to amend and reenact§§ 33.1-269 and 33.1-277 of the Code of Virginia, relating to the 
State Revenue Bond Act. 
S.B. 466. An Act to amend and reenact§ 46.2-1231 of the Code of Virginia, relating to towing of 
motor vehicles. 
S.B. 479. An Act to amend and reenact §§ 2.1-639.15 and 2.1-639.41 of the Code of Virginia, 
relating to the conflict of interests laws; disclosure forms, including disclosure of certain real 
estate and lease interests. 
S.B. 481. An Act to amend the Code of Virginia by adding a section numbered 8.01-275.1, relating 
to service of process. 
S.B. 492. An Act to amend and reenact§ 55-19.5 of the Code of Virginia, relating to certain inter 
vivos trust exemptions relating to Medicaid assets. 
S.B. 498. An Act to amend the Code of Virginia by adding in Tide 2.1 a chapter numbered 48, 
consisting of sections numbered 2.1-769 through 2.1-784, and to repeal Chapter 2:1 (§§ 30-
28.01 through 30-28.9: 1} of Tide 30 of the Code of Virginia, relating to lobbying to influence 
legislation and executive orders; penalties. 
S.B. 500. An Act to authorize the issuance of Commonwealth of Virginia Transportation Revenue 
Bonds, by and with the consent of the Governor pursuant to the provisions of Article 5 (§ 33.1-
267 et seq.) of Chapter 3 of Title 33.1 of the Code of Virginia and as permitted by Section 9 (d) 
of Article X of the Constitution of Virginia, in a principal amount not exceeding $82,389,000, 
plus an amount for the issuance costs, capitalized interest, reserve funds, ·and other financing 
expenses (Including, without limitation, any original issue discount), for the purpose of 
providing funds, with any other avaHable funds, for paying aU or a portion of the costs incurred 
or to be incurred for construction of an adequate, modem, safe, and efficient transportl!tion 
system in that part of the Commonwealth that comprises the Interstate 66 Economic 
Development Program; authorizing the Commonwealth Transportation Board to fix the details 
of such bonds and to provide for the sale of such bonds at public or private sale; providing for 
the pledge under a payment agreement with the Treasury Board of Transportation Trust Fund 
revenues, including funds which may be otherwise appropriated by the General Assembly; 
further providing that the interest income from such bonds shalt be exempt from all taxation 
within the Commonwealth; and to amend and reenact§§ 33.1-268, 33.1-269 and 33.1-2TI of 
the Code of Virginia and to amend the Code of Virginia by adding sections numbered 33.1-
221.1:4 and 58.1-2146.1, relating to the creation of the Interstate 66 Economic Development 
Program Fund and amending the State Revenue Bond Act to include the Program. 
S.B. 513. An Act to amend and reenact Chapter 293 of the Acts of Assembly of 1991, carried by 
reference in the Code of Virginia as § 3.1-22.28, and to amend and reenact§ 3.1-22.29 of the 
Code of Virginia, relating to the right to farm. 
S.B. 516. An Act to amend and reenact§§ 14.1-SI, IS.I-9, IS.I-50.1, IS.I-50.2 and 15.l-821 of the 
Code of Virginia, relating to attorneys for the Commonwealth; uncompensated volunteers; 
sunset. 
S.B. 520. An Act to amend and reenact§§ 16.1-228 and 16.1-241, as they are currently effective 
and as they may become effective;§ 16.1-249; §§ 16.1-270, 16.1-271, 16.1-275, 16.1-278.8, 
000~13 
,11 
.·· ~ 
ACTS 
OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
OF mE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
1994 REGULAR SESSION 
which met at the State Capitol, Richmond 
Convened Wednesday, January 12, 1994 
Adjourned sine die Saturday, March 12, 1994 
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CH. 518] ACTS OF ASSEMBLY 725 
§ 20-107.1. Court may decree as to maintenance and support of spouses. 
Upon deereeffig entry of a decree providing (i) for the dissolution of a marriage, aftd else 
epett &eereetttg (ii) for a divorce, whether from the bond of matrimony or from bed and board, 
afttl ~ deer~ (iii) that neither party Is entitled to a divorce, or (iv} for separate 
maintenance, t~e court may make such further decree as It shall deem expedient concerning 
the maintenance and support of the spouses. However, the court shaJI have no authority to 
decree maintenance and suppo_rt payable by the estate of a deceased spouse .. 
Any maintenance and suppo~ shall be subject to the limitations set forth In § 20-109, and 
no permanent maintenance and support shall be awarded from a spouse If there exists In such 
spouse's favor a ground Qf divorce under the provisions of § 20-91 (1). However, the court may 
make such an award notwithstanding the existence of such ground if the court determines from 
clear and convincing evidence, that a denial of support and maintenance would constitute a 
manifest Injustice, based upon the respective degrees of fault durtng the marriage and the 
relative economic circumstances of the parties. The court, In Its discretion, may decree that 
maintenance and support of a spouse be made in periodic payments, or In a lump sum award, 
or both. 
The court, In determining whether to award support and maintenance for a spouse, shall 
consider the circumstances and factors which contributed to the dissolution of the marriage, 
specifically Including adultery and any other ground for divorce under the provisions of § 20-91 
(3) or (6) or § 20-95. If the court determines that an award should be made, It shall, In 
determining the amount, consider the following: 
I. The earning capacity, obligations, needs and financial resources of the parties, including 
but not limited to income from all pension, profit sharing or retirement plans, of whatevei: 
nature; . 
2. The education and training of the parties and the ability and opportunity of the parties to 
secure such education and training; 
3. The standard of living established during the marriage; 
4. The duration of the marriage; 
5. The age and physical and mental condition of the parties; 
6. The contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the 
family; 
7. The property Interests of the parties, both real and personal, tangible and Intangible; 
8. The provisions made with regard to the marital property under § 20-107.3; and 
9. Such other factors, Including the tax consequences to each party, as are necessary to 
consider the equities between the parties. 
§ 20-109. Changing maintenance and support for a spouse; effect of stipulations as to 
maintenance and support for a spouse; cessation upon remarriage or death. 
Upon petition of either party the court may increase, decrease, or terminate spousal support 
and maintenance that may thereafter accrue, whether previously or hereafter awarded, as the 
circumstances may make proper. However, in suits for divorce, annulment and separate 
maintenance, and in proceedings arising under subdivision A 3 or L of § 16.1-241, If a 
stipulation or contract signed by the party to whom such relief might otherwise be awarded Is 
filed before entry of a final decree, no decree or order directing the payment of support and 
maintenance for the spouse, suit money, or counsel fee or establishing or Imposing any other 
condition or consideration, monetary or nonmonetary, shall be entered except in accordance 
with that stipulation or contracl Upon the death or remarriage of the spouse receiving support, 
spousal support shall terminate unless otherwise provided by stipulation or contracl It such a 
stipulation or contract Is flied after entry of a final decree and if any party so moves, the court 
shall modify Its decree to conform to such stipulation or contract. 
CHAPTER 519 
An Act to amend the Code of Virginia by adding a section numbered 8.01·275.1, relating to 
service of process. 
(S 482) 
Approved April 9, 1994 
Be It enacted by the General Assembly of VIrginia: 
I. That the Code of Virginia is amended by adding a section numbered 8.01·275.1 as follows: 
§_ 8.01-275.1. When service of process is timely. 
"Service of process in an action or suit within twelve months of commencement of the 
or suit against a defendant shaH be timely as to that defendant. Service of process on a 000.115 
3UG.-
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defendant more than twelve months after the suit or action was commenced shall be timely 
upon a finding by the court that the plaintiff exercised due diligence to have timely service 
made on the defendant. 
CHAPTER 520 
An Act to authorize the issuance of Commonwealth of Virginia Transportation Revenue Bonds 
by and wi'th the consent of the Governor pursuant to the provisions of Article 5 (§ 33.1·267 
et seq.) of Chapter 3 of Title 33.1 of the Code of Virginia and as permitted by Section 9 (d} 
of ArtiCle X of the Constitution of Virginia, in a principal amount not exceedmg 
$82,389,000, plus on amount for the issuance costs, capitalized interest, reserve funds, and 
other financmg elpenses (including, without limitation, any anginal issue discount), for the 
purpose of providmg funds, with any other available funds, for paying all or a portion of" 
the costs incurred or to be incu"ed for construction of an adequate, modem, safe, and 
efficient transportation system in that part of the Commonwealth that compnses the 
Interstate 66 Economic Development Program; authorizing the Commonwealth 
Transportation Board to fix the details of such bonds and to provide for the sale of such 
bonds at public or pn'vate sale; providing for the pledge under a payment agreement with 
the Treasury Board of Transportation Trust Fund revenues, including funds which may be 
otherwise appropriated by the General Assembly; further providing that the interest income 
from such bonds shall be exempt from aU taxation within the Commonwealth; and to 
amend and reenact §§ 33.1·268, 33.1-269 and 33.1·277 of the Code of Virginia and to amend 
the Code of Virginia by adding sections numbered 33.1-221.1:4 and 58.1-2146.1, relating to 
the creation of the Interstate 66 Economic Development Program Fund and amending the 
State Revenue Bond Act to include the Program. 
[S 500) 
Approved April 9, 1994 
Whereas, Section 9. (d) of Ariicle X of the Constitution of Virginia and §§ 33.1-267 through 
33.1-295 of the Code of Virginia provide that the General Assembly may authorize the issuance 
of bonds secured by Transportation Trust Fund revenues under a payment agreement between 
the Commonwealth Transportation Board and the Treasury Board, subject to appropriations by 
the General Assembly and payable first from (I) revenues received from the Interstate 66 
Economic Development Program Fund, (II) to the extent required, funds appropriated and 
allocated for secondary roads pursuant to § 33.1-23.4 to the county In which the project or 
projects to be financed are .located, (Ill) to the extent required, legally available revenues of the 
Transportation Trust Fund,' and (lv) such other funds which may be appropriated by the 
General Assembly; and 
Whereas, the projects described herein are part of the Northern VIrginia 2010 
Transportation Plan and will be state highways operated and maintained by the Commonwealth 
Transportation Board as described In § 33.1-12; now, therefore, 
Be It enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia: 
1. § 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Interstate 66 Economic Development 
Program, Commonwealth of Virginia Revenue Bond Act of I994." 
§ 2. The Commonwealth Transportation Board is hereby authorized, by and with the 
com;ent of the Governor, to issue, pursuant to the provisions of §§ 33.1-267 through 33.I-295 of 
the Code of Virginia, at one time or from time to time in one or more series, bonds of the 
Commonwealth to be designated "Commonwealth of Virginia Transportation Revenue Bonds, 
Series ..... ," in an aggregate principal amount not exceeding $82,389,000, plus an amount for 
the issuance costs, capitalized interest, reserve funds, and other financing expenses (r'ndudmg, 
without limitation, anginal issue discount) (the "Bonds'?· The proceeds ot such Bonds shall be 
used exclusively for the purpose of providing funds, with any other available funds, for paying 
the costs incurred or to be 1"ncu"ed for construction or fundr"ng of the projects that comprise 
the Interstate 66 Economic Development Program as hereinafter defined and as established in 
Article 5 (§ 33.1-267 et seq.) of Chapter 3 of Title 33.1, consisting of environmental and 
eng1"neering studies, design, riqhts-of-way acquisition, construction and related improvements (the 
'"projects'?· Such costs shall mclude the payment of interest on the Bonds for a period during 
construction and not exceeding one year after completion of construction of the projects. 
The projects constitute the Interstate 66 Economic Development Program and consist 
generally of the design, acquisition and construction of certain improvements to, and 
contiguous to, Interstate 66 m Northern Virginia, including but not limited to ( 1) capqcity 
000116 
§ R.Ot.-272 CIVIL REJ\H.:DJF:S AND PROCEDURE § 8.01-277 
§ 8.01-272. Pleading several matters; joining tort and contract 
clnims; separate trial in discretion of court; counterclaims. 
I. Decillions Under Current Law. 
A. General Consideration. 
I. DECISIONS UNDER CURRENT LAW. 
A. General Consideration. 
The plaintift''s claim against driver for 
negligent operation of an automobile does 
not arise from the same transaction or 
occurrence as the plaintiff's claim against doc-
tor for medical malpractice where first, there 
was negligent operation of a motor vehicle by 
driver resulting in an accident; and, then there 
was negligent medical treatment of plaintiff at 
a later date by the doctor resulting in injury. 
Powers v. Cherin, 249 Va. 33, 452 S.E.2d 666 
(1995). 
§ 8.01-273. Demurrer; form; grounds to be stated; amendment. 
I. Decillions Under Current Law. 
A. General Consideration. 
I. DECISIONS UNDER CURRENT LAW. 
A. General Consideration. 
A demurrer, unlike a motion for IJUm· 
mary judgment, does not allow the court to 
evaluate and decide the merits of a claim; it 
only tests the sufficiency of factual allegations 
to determine whether the motion for judgment 
states a cause of action. Fun v. Virginia Military 
Inst., 422 S.E.2d 770 (19921. 
§ 8.01-273.1. Motion for judgment; motion to refer; Virginia Birth-
Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act. - In any civil action, 
where a party moves to refer a cause of action to the Workers' Compensation 
Commission for the purposes of determining whether the cause of action 
satisfies the requirements of the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury 
Compensation Act(§ 38.2-5000 et seq.), the court shall forward the motion to 
refer together with a copy of the motion for judgment to the Commission and 
stay all proceedings on the cause of action pending an award and notification 
by the Commission of its disposition. (1999, c. 822.) 
§ 8.01-275.1. When service of process is timely.- Service of process in 
an action or suit within twelve months of commencement of the action or suit 
against a defendant shall be timely as to that defendant. Service of process on 
a defendant more than twelve months after the suit or action was commenced 
shall be timely upon a finding by the court that the plaintiff exercised due 
diligence to have timely service made on the defendant. (1994, c. 519.) 
Applied in Gilbreath v. Brewster; 250 Va. 
436, 463 S.E.2d 836 (19951. 
§ 8.01-277. Defective process; motion to quash; amendment. -A 
person, upon whom process to answer any action has been served, may take 
advantage of any defect in the issuance, service or return thereof by a motion 
to quash filed prior to or simultaneously with the filing of any pleading to the 
merits. Upon sustaining the motion, the court may strike the proof of.service 
or permit amendment of the process or its return as may seeinjust. (Code 1950, 
§ 8-118; l954, c. 333; 1977, c. 617; 1994, c. 37.) 
The 1994 amendment substituted •strike 
the proof of service• for •dismiss the action• in 
the second sentence. 
78 
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§ 8.01-281 
§ 8.01-281. Pleading 
party. 
I. Decisions Under Current Lav. 
A. General Consideration. 
I. DECISIONS UNDER CUR: 
A. General Considers 
Rule 3:10 and this section E 
cedural devices to promotA ju· 
by having all claims, actual or po 
from the same transaction or occ 
mined in one proceeding. Virgin 
Inc. v. Ceres Marine Terms.~ Inc 
31 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
Sufficiency. - Where the a 
pleading support two altemati 
recovery, the pleading of one is r 
ficient by the insufficiency of th 
& Assocs. v. Lakes on 360, Inc., 2 
S.E.2d 453 (1995). 
- Effe~t of section. - In the 
section and Rule 3:10, a party ~ 
for indemnity or contribution a 
Article 3. 
Who and Where to S'ervc 
Sec. 
8.01-293. Who to serve process 
l 
Article 4. 
Who to Be Serve 
8.01-296. Manner of serving 
natural persons. 
§ 8.01-288. Process r 
accepted. 
I. Decisions Under Current La 
A. General Consicleration. 
I. DECISIONS UNDER CU 
A. General Conside11 
Section applicable to pet 
cial review. of decisiCJns o 
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January 3, 1994 
senator Malfourd w. Trumbo 
P.O. Box 44 
F'incastle, Virginia ;).4090 
Re: VTLA Legislative Proposal 
-Dear Bo: 
•J)o:J.Z.foH.OWJS 
(00·1-) 6-10--2-14-2 
FJ\CSUULE 
(tt04) 6'1-U-44!!.0 
I am writing on behalf of the Virginia Trial Lawyers 
Association to ask that you consider serving as patron for the 
attnchcd piece of legislation. 
As you may be aware, the Virginia Supreme Court has been · 
considering changing Rules 3;3 and 2:4 in regard to the 1.2 month 
rule. These rules provide, in part, that you may file a motion for judgment or bill of complaint with the clerk but not seek service 
for up to 12 months. The Supreme court has proposed a change to 
reduce this period of time from 12 months to 4 months. As can be 
seen from the enclosed position paper, VTLA has strong reservations 
about this change. 
The rule changes were actually set to go into effect until 
VTI~ nnd others raised a ruckus about a lack of notice and public 
discussion before passage. The court withdrew the changes but has 
been quite difficult to pin down on whether they intend to go 
forward with the change. This legislative proposal is designed to 
take this issue off the table by codifying the present rule. 
I talked to Chip Woodrum about this proposal. He suggested 
that it be started in the senate because that would give the Court 
less time to organize a lobbying effort. He said he would be happy 
to push it through the House. He also suggested that you would be 
a fino patron on the Senate side -- you can thank him later for 
this vote of confidence. 
I wanted to send this to you so you could think about it 
before I put you on the spot with a personal appeal. I will give 
you a call within the next few days to answer any questions you may 
have and to implore your assistance with this matter. 
'10011.9 
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Thanking you for your consideration, I am 
Yours very truly, 
M<--.\::-
Mark E. Rubin 
MERfep 
Enclosure 
, I ' 
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ONE YE~R SERVICE RULE 
currently, a law suit may filed in virginia with the request 
that it not be sorved on the defendant. If a law suit is filod in 
the courthouse b\.lt not served on the defendant, the practical 
effect is that the case remains in the clerk of court's hands but 
is not brought to the tlefendant' s attention. since the defendant 
has no notice of the law suit, he or she has no obligation to 
x·espond to it and no further action can be taken on it, by anyona 
including the court, until the defendant does receive notice of the 
suit. 
In most instances, persons who bring lawsuits are Qager to 
hnve the matter resolved as quickly as possible so they requost 
servico as quickly as possible. 'l'here are, however, situations in 
which i·t is advisabJ e not to seek service and to delay the 
commencement of activities that will cost both parties and the 
cou-rt system money. 
Rule 3;3 of the Virginia supreme Court has always recognized 
those situations by allowing a party one year from the date of 
filirJg a lawsuit to the time that it must be served on the 
defcnc.tant to be eff.ccti ve. '!'here is currently a proposal to amend 
thiG Rule to shorten this time period from one year to four months. 
While this proposed amendment will assist the courts to keep 
their records in better order, it is a short term gain with 
expansive long term effects. The main defect in the proposal is 
that i·t will .result in unnecessary litigation. 
1'he main reason to file a lawsuit without seeking immediate 
servlcc is to stop the statute of limitations from running on the 
clnim. This is sometimes· necessary because a party may still be 
undergoing tnedical treatment two years from the date of the injury 
and the full extent of the injury is unknown at the time the 
statute of limitations ~ill run and bar the claim. There are also 
situations in which prior to filing suit against a known wrongdoer 
a plaintiff cannot have sufficient information as to whether other. 
matters or :i.ndividuals nllould be covered. Undar the present rule, 
a plaintiff can file a "covering" suit against others who may or 
may not be responsible for the harm, withhold service, and conduct 
discovery in a separate suit filed against the known wrongdoer. If 
this discovery indicates that the defendants in the "covering" suit 
arc not liable, that suit can be withdrawn without costing those 
perF:ons any time, expense or inconvenience• With a shortened rule, 
unnecessary litigation and costs may be incurred. 
In other instar1ces, it is very difficult to find the 
defendant. De! end ants sometimes move without leaving a forwarding 
address. ~dditional time may be needed either to find him or her 
or to exercise the due diligence inquiry required before one can 
invoke the rules allowing service where no address is known. In 
still other circumstances, the defendant is well aware of the claim 
and is seeking to negotiate a settlement. If service must be done 
0001.2~ 
• 
in n shorter time, these negotiations may be short circuited and 
everyone muf;t commence the litigation, with its attendant costs, 
when th,is would be unnecessary. 
The lnain complaints about the rules come from the courts which 
must maintain the file on their docket for a year. However, this 
seems like a small cost in relation to the expenditures which will 
be incurred as a result of a shorter time period • 
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* * 
Gilbreath '· Brewster 
250 Va. 436 (1995) 
* * 
1 We note _that in 1994, the General Assembly enacted Code§ 8.01-275.1, which codi-
fies the one year service provision of Rule 3:3. This Code section, I.ike the· Rule, does nor 
address the effect of the dismissal. That sta-tute is not at issue in th~s case. 
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Avery T. Waterman, Jr., 
Esq. 
VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NEWPORT 
NEWS' 
LAURIE F. S. WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SANDY BUTLER, et al., 
Defendants. 
Law No.: 26466-RW 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAURIE F. S WATERMAN 
COJ\.1MONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
BEFORE :ME, the undersigned Notary Public, came and appeared LAURIE F. 
S. WATERMAN, personally known to me, who, after being duly sworn, did depose 
and state: 
1. I am Plaintiff in the captioned matter and an adult of sound mind; . 
2. Defendants contemporaneously had actual knowledge of the alleged 
malpractice at issue in the captioned matter, that I was damaged by the same 
and that they faced a malpractice claim; 
Patten, Womom, HatteD & 3 
. 'llllonstein, L.C. • In or about 1994, I conferred about the foregoing with Ms. J ody Friend of Risk~ 
Management at Riv~rside; she requested me to forward my medical expenses, 
wage loss and any other damages; and she assured that the same would be 
reimbursed; 
Jelferson Avenue 
Suite 360 
l-l~wport News, Vttginia 
23602 
(757) 223-4555 
000129 
. '· 
4. Having worked for Riverside and observed personnel management for 
r approximately 7 years, during the pendency ·of my previously filed medical 
malpractice suit, I believed that I would be subject to termination, censure or 
other de facto retaliation by my own Defendant employer if service of process 
were effected or even if the pendency of the matter were otherwise disclosed; 
and 
5. The foregoing is made based on and to the best of my personal knowledge, 
information and belief. 
BEYOND THAT, Affiant sayeth naught. 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME, 
ON THISZ..q DAY OF OCTOBER, 1999 . 
:~ .. My ~~mmission expires: ·;uw O.Z(SEAL) 
.... 
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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF NEW:PORT NEWS 
LAURIE F.S: WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. Law No.: 26466-RC 
SANDY BUTLER, et al., 
ORDER 
On August 18, 1999, came the parties, by counsel, on various motions, including the Plea 
of the Statute of Limitations, Plea in Bar and Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Rein and · 
Couleman and the Special Plea of the Statute of Limitations, Plea of Lack of Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Butler, McCormick and Riverside Hospital, 
Inc. At that time, the Court reserved judgment on these Pleas and Motions. 
Accordingly, upon the pleadings and briefs filed, the arguments of counsel for the parties, 
and further for good cause shown, the Court FINDS as follows: 
1. That the plaintiff filed her Motion for Judgment in the Circuit Court for the City of 
Portsmouth, Virginia, on March 18, 1996, alleging acts of negligence against the defendants in 
failing to provide pain management services to the plaintiff between March 14, 1994 and March 17, 
1994. Service of process was never effected against any of the defendants, and, to the Court's 
knowledge, none was ever attempted. Indeed, it is clear in the facts of this case that no attempt was 
made to effect service after the commencement of the action and it is further clear that the defendants 
had no knowledge of the commenced action. 
2. That on Apri128, 1997, the original Motion for Judgment was non-suited ex parte. 
1 of 4 
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·., 
3. That the plaintiffs Motion for Judgment was refiled in the Circuit Court for the City 
of Portsmouth on October 3, 1997 and properly served in late September and/or early October 1998. 
The action was subsequently transferred to this Court by order of the Portsmouth Circuit Court. 
4. That Rule 3:3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia and Virginia Code 
Sections 8.01-380, 8.01-229(E)(3), and 8.01-275.1 are implicated here. 
5. That the Court is of the opinion that the General Assembly enacted Code Section 
8.01-275.1 to eliminate the problems that the Supreme Court addressed in Clark v. Butler, 228 Va. 
506 (1989). 
6. That when Rule 3:3 is invoked and it is clear that more than twelve months have 
expired since the commencement of the action, the only authority the Court should have is to 
determine if due diligence was exercised to have timely service effected on the defendants. 
7. That the plaintiff was not required to give evidence and show that due diligence was 
used in attempting to effect service ofthe original Motion for Judgment prior to taking her nonsuit 
of April 28, 1997. This defeats the purpose of Rule 3:3 and Virginia Code Section 8.01-275.1, 
which is to provide for timely prosecution of law suits and to avoid abuse of the judicial system. 
8. That, accordingly, the plaintiff did not effect service within the guidelines of Rule 3:3 
and Virginia Code Section 8.01-275.1. 
Based upoll the fmdings of fact and law as outlined above and as furthermore set forth in the 
pleadings and briefs filed by the parties and in the oral argument of counsel, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED and DECREED: 
1. That the Plea of the Statute of Limitations, Plea in Bar and Motion to Dismiss filed 
by defendants Rein and Couleman and the Special Plea of the Statute of Limitations, Pl~a of Lack 
2 of 4 
000:132 
. .. 
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Butler, McCormick and 
Riverside Hospital, Inc. are hereby GRANTED and that this action is DISMISSED, with prejudice 
as to these defendants. 
2. That the Court hereby incorporates by reference its letter opinion of October 5, 1999. 
SEEN: 
Todd D. Anderson, Esq. 
Counsel for Riverside Hospital Inc., 
Sandy (Butler) Haverson and Michelle McCormick 
~: 3.VJ vv~ 
Gerald Walsh, Esq 
Counsel for Dr. Paul Rein and Dr. Nan Couleman 
m~.~w.x;UJ~xx 
~~~~~XIIXXXXX 
ENTERED: jl-/- ~ f 
a~~r 
HONO E R.T. WEST . 
3 of 4 
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·• SEEN AND OBJECTED T ~OR MANIFEST ERRORS OF I . :T AND LAW: 
A. Defendants elevate opinion to findings; 
B. Plaintiff alleges negligence other than "failing to provide pain management services"; 
C. No evidence was taken re Defendants' (lack of) knowledge of the non-suited action; 
~ D. Defendants had actual contemporaneous knowledge of the untoward events and 
resulting injury in question; 
E. Rule 3:3 ofthe Virginia Supreme Court and Section 8.01-275.1 of the Code of 
Virginia are not implicated or invoked; 
F. Section 8.01-275.1 merely codifies Rule 3:3; 
G. Section 8.01-275.1 was not enacted to overrule Clarkv. Butler, 228 Va. 506 (1989) or 
otherwise to eliminate problems therein; 
H. The 1 year commencement/service requirement is measured by the instant suit alone 
not the non-suited action, and more than 12 months have not expired; 
I. There is no authority now "to determine if due diligence was exercised to have timely 
service effected on the Defendants" in the closed non-suited action; 
J. Plaintiff not being required to give evidence about due diligence in the non-suited 
action is the rule of Clark v. Butler, supra, and does not defeat the purpose of Rule 3:3 
(as opined therein) or of its codification, Code Section 8.01-275.1; 
K. Plaintifftimely effected service under Rule 3:3 and Section 8.01-275.1; and 
L. Plaintiff had "good cause", i.e., reasonable fear of termination or other workplace 
retaliation by her Defendant employer, for not effecting service of process and for 
non-suiting the original action. 
Page 4 of4 0001.34 
~£&£nilf Jjulricial illirruit 
OF VIRGINIA 
November 17, 1999 
RANDOLPH T. WEST . 
JUDGE 
Mr. Avery T. Waterman, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
12350 Jefferson Avenue, Suite 360 
Newport News, VA 23602 
RE: Waterman v. Butler 
Law No. 26466-RW 
Dear Mr. Waterman: 
2500 WASHINGTON AVENUE 
COURTROOM ONE 
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA 23607 
(757) 926-8837 
This will acknowledge receipt of your lette~ dated November 11, 1999, with the 
attached Motion for Reconsideration and Rehearing and the Memorandum in support of 
same. 
The Court has previously denied this motion inasmuch as the previous motion 
only requested that you be allowed to offer additional argument and offered absolutely 
no change in the factual situation that the Court originally heard. Again, a Motion for 
Reconsideration does not alter the original facts and, therefore, the Court declines to 
hear additional argument. The Court has thoroughly researched the question of proper 
service and, right or wrong, has made its decision. If the Court's decision is incorrect, 
. I am confident that the Supreme ~ourt· wil~ correct same. 
Again, the Court directs Ms. Oast to present an Order setting forth the Court's 
ruling. 
Please govern yourself accordingly. 
Very truly yours, 
~ • "• I : 
RTW:jhs 
cc: Carolyn P. Oast, Esq. 
Gerald R. Walsh, Esq. 
., 
VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE CITY OF 
NEWPORT NEWS 
LAURIE F. S. WATERMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. Law No.: 26466-RW.: 
SANDY BUTLER, et al., 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CONIES NOW Plaintiff, by undersigned counsel, and hereby gives 
notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia from the final judgment 
order of this Court entered by the Honorable Randolph T. West on November 
1, 1999, and further gives notice that a statement of facts and other incidents 
of the case will be filed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Avery T. Waterman, Jr., Esq. 
VSB No. 27118 
Laurie F. S. Waterman 
Patten, Womom, Hatten & Diamonstein, L.C. 
12350 Jefferson Ave., Suite 360 
Newport News, Virginia 23602 
(757) 223-4555 . 
/ 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
' 
I, Avery T. Watennan, Jr., counsel of record for Plaintiff, hereby certify 
that: 
1. The name and address of the Appellant is Laurie F. S. Watennan, 217 
East Tazewell's Way, Williamsburg, VA 23185. 
2. The name, address and telephone number of counsel for Appellant is: 
Avery T. Watennan, Jr., Esq., Patten, Womom, Hatten & Diamonstein, 
L.C., 12350 Jefferson Avenue, Suite 360, Newport News, VA 23602 
(757) 223-4555. 
3. The names and addresses of Appellees are: Sandy (Butler) Halvorson, 
500 J. Clyde Morris Boulevard, Newport News, VA 23601; Michelle 
"Roe" McConnick, 500 J. Clyde Morris Boulevard, Newport News, VA 
23601; Riverside Hospital, Inc., 500 J. Clyde Morris Boulevard, 
Newport News, VA 23601; Nancy Couleman, 76 Queens Court, 
Newport News, VA; and Paul Rein, 12420 Warwick Boulevard, Suite 
7D, Newport News, VA 23606. 
4. The names, addresses and telephone numbers of counsel for Appellees 
are: Carolyn P. Oast, Esq./Todd D. Anderson, Esq., Heilig, McKenry, 
Fraim & Lollar, P.C., 700 Newtown Road, Norfolk, VA 23502 (757) 
461-2500; andGeraldR. Walsh, Esq., Suite200, 4020UniversityDrive, 
Fairfax, VA 22030-6802 (703) 385-6162. 
5. There is no transcript to be ordered for the hearing in question as there 
was no Court Reporter present. 
6. A copy of Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal has been mailed to all opposing 
counsel and to the Clerk of the Supreme Court ofVirginia on December 
1, 1999. 
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FORM 3. BOND FOR COSTS ALONE REQUIRED BY APPELLATE COURT ON 
APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT 
,_KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That we ,:£o...y,v.,;__ J. S., IA..,~;(]:: .... M_(J...J.... 
principal and 
, surety, are held and 
----------------~------------~-----------
firmlybounduntos6:<"41 (t2uJ.:.L..) b)cJv.P-.1...,_ LifcJ.s 
. O Appellee (s) 1 • 
in the sum of - t.-~...--i l..l.UJ u c.~ j) oJl.J.CM...$ ( Ji>Q)(').{)CJ ll 
to the payment of which we bind ourselves, our heirs, successors, 
personal representatives and assigns, jointly and severally, firmly 
by these presents. 
The condition of this obligation is such that: 
Whereas, the ~me Court o~iJlOOW (Court ~b-JtPeals of 
Virginia) on the Ol'l~ day of Cl.p-lA.L , ~"2~ awarded 
an appeal from a judgment rendered against a<cu.., ,u..i.- .;j. $. i,(,)r..._Lf:n\{J...o'-
Appellant(s) 
by the Circuit Court of Newport News on the I~ day of 
'ltt .o.vQ~ . 11e~1?, upon Ac~y,: .:J .. S. LA.J~Mo--._ 
or some one for (him) 
~~(them) .(it), filing an appeal bond with sufficient security 
in~he clerk's office of the Circuit Court of Newport News, in the 
penaltyof "=h-<J..A..i- Ll-u..A(iiLul-bcO_!c..-<.$ (~Q:rj.oo) Cf€H within 
fifteen (~5) days of the date of the certificate of appeal, with 
condition as the law directs; 
Now, therefore, if ofq~ 4. S. L.VaJ.fmcv--
Appellant (s) 
shall pay all damages, costs, and fees which may be awarded against 
(him) (~ (them) (it) in the ~~;···eourt.::D (Court of Appeals 
and Supreme Court if it takes cognizance of the claim), then this 
obligation shall be void, otherwise, to remain in full force and 
virtue. 
In witness, whereof, the said _<A~~'S~..!"'d~oo"~L,..o~"--'."1-...._ .. ....,~ .. :_..W"""'--"rM.:J4o!t'-'&._-;-"""".....,<Jc=-""-';;....-
principal, and surety, hav~ 
hereunto set their hands and seals, this ~~ day of 
-l>p:..-;¥4f6,,. t{..I.<'Uft.{,.:l'.__' "';f;,!--'2/:i:l..-4, /t""u:u..Pid.od:a..t ..:../.72'-"'l:?w:··/........_2 __ ( seal) 
______________________________ (seal) 
______________________________ (seal) 
My commission expires=----------------
/ I coenlty that the aocumem to w!>ic:n tnls 
authen!Jcatlon Is affiXe;l Is a true copy of a 
record rn the Newpon News Circuit Coun that 
I have, custody of the record and 1 a~ the 
custod . of that record. 
Rex vts, Cl81k 
0001.38 
